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 Group Decision Making with Uncertain Outcomes:





Predicting group decisions with uncertain outcomes involves the empirically dicult task of disentan-
gling individual decision makers' beliefs and preferences over outcomes' states from the group's decision
rule. This paper addresses the problem within the context of a consequential family decision concerning
the high school track of adolescent children in presence of curricular stratication. The paper combines
novel data on children's and parents' probabilistic beliefs, their stated choice preferences, and families'
decision rules with standard data on actual choices to estimate a simple model of curriculum choice
featuring both uncertainty and heterogeneous cooperative-type decisions. The model's estimates are
used to quantify the impact on curriculum enrollment of policies aecting family members' expectations
via \awareness" campaigns, publication of education statistics, and changes in curricular specialization
and standards. The latter exercise reveals that identity of policy recipients{whether children, parents,
or both{matters for enrollment response, and underlines the importance of incorporating information
on decision makers' beliefs and decision rules when evaluating policies.
[JEL codes: C25, C35, C50, C71, C81, C83, D19, D81, D84, I29, J24.]
[Key words: Choice under Uncertainty, Multilateral Choice, Heterogeneous Decision Rules, Curricular
Tracking, Curriculum Choice, Child-Parent Decision Making, Subjective Probabilities, Stated and Revealed
Preferences, Choice-Based Sampling.]
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university, what can he do? And after studying art in a general high school? Because when one is 14 he
makes a choice, and thinks that, perhaps, he will go to college afterwards... But after 5 years he might
change his mind. And if he is fed up with school, then he can go to work [if he attended a technical or
vocational school, instead]." (a brother) (Istituto IARD, 2001, p.62)1
\As for the high school curriculum, she decided what to study. She chose the school, but only after we
had talked together. Her father, for instance, preferred another [type of] school and, perhaps, I hoped
for yet a dierent one. But she made her own choice in the end, after a series of discussions we had
together." (a mother) (Istituto IARD, 2001, p.39)
1 Introduction
Social researchers and policy makers have long been interested in analyzing and predicting
choices with uncertain outcomes and multiple decision makers. These choices span human cap-
ital investment, sexual behavior, crime behavior, and countless others. For instance, members
of criminal gangs choose whether to commit crimes with partial knowledge of their probability
of being arrested; sexually active partners make contraceptive choices with partial knowledge
of eectiveness and side eects; family members select curricular tracks for their children with
partial knowledge of children's tastes, ability, and future opportunities and choices. However,
predicting any of these behaviors to inform policy requires disentangling decision makers' be-
liefs and preferences over outcomes' states from the group's decision rule. This is because there
will generally exist several congurations of beliefs, preferences, and decision rules that are
compatible with the same observed choice and have dierent implications for policy.
In this paper, I focus on choice of high school curriculum with curricular tracking, and
I address the identication problem of empirically distinguishing how children's and parents'
beliefs and preferences over choice-related outcomes drive curriculum choice via heterogeneous
rules of child-parent decision making. Nonetheless, while substantively my analysis is relevant
both for the debate on intergenerational transmission of beliefs and preferences from parents to
children (e.g., Bisin and Verdier (2001) and Doepke and Zilibotti (2008)) and for understanding
the role of preferences and information in career-oriented school choices (e.g., Arcidiacono et al.
(2011) and Zafar (2008)){and hence for educational policy{the framework I study is more
general. It encompasses any choice situation featuring a small group of decision makers that
face a common discrete choice with uncertain outcomes, hold subjective beliefs and individual
preferences over outcomes' states, and employ a cooperative-type decision rule aggregating their
preferences and beliefs and nesting more unilateral decisions as special cases.2
1From the Istituto IARD (2001)'s sociological study. My translation from Italian.
2From a theoretical perspective, the paper's setup may be thought of as an application of Savage (1954)'s framework and
Harsanyi (1955)'s utilitarian aggregation combined, as recently conceptualized and discussed by Gilboa et al. (2004). An
important feature of this framework is that unanimity of group members' preferences over alternatives does not imply that
an individually preferred alternative is also socially preferred, since unanimity may be generated by dierent combinations of
individual preferences and beliefs over states of nature (see Mongin (2005)'s in-depth discussion and Raia (1968)'s \Paretians-
vs.-Bayesians" dramatization). In fact, while I assume that decision makers are individually rational{in the sense that they
maximize expected utility{I do not assume a priori that they hold rational expectations nor I make any specic assumption
about the manner in which they update their own beliefs based on information they receive from the other members of the
1To illustrate, let us consider the choice faced by an adolescent child (\he") and his parent
(\she"), both wishing to select the best curriculum for the child between art and math. For
simplicity, let child and parent be only concerned with the child's taste for subjects and the
program's diculty level given child's ability, all of which are uncertain. Child and parent hold
subjective probabilistic beliefs over realization of dierent taste and diculty states and attach
individual valuations to them. (Perhaps the child thinks he is an artist and should follow his
talent, whereas his mother thinks he has got what it takes to become a brilliant mathematician!)
Moreover, either the child makes curriculum choice individually or child and parent make a joint
decision.
In this setting, being able to tell beliefs and preferences apart is important for policy makers,
since expectation-driven choices may be aected by some policy, e.g., by provision of informa-
tion about subjects and diculty levels, while preference-driven choices may require a dierent
policy, e.g., no policy. Furthermore, identifying the target{child, parent, or both?{of a policy
that aims at aecting curriculum enrollment via information provision and assessing the poten-
tial eectiveness of such a policy via counterfactual analysis require uncovering the role played
by each decision participant in the choice.
Thus far, insucient prior knowledge and lack of adequate data on how individuals and
groups make decisions with uncertain outcomes has rendered this identication problem hard
to tackle empirically (Manski, 2004a, 2000). First, commonly available data are limited to
decision makers' characteristics and some features of the alternatives. Second, any statistical
analysis associating choices with decision makers' background characteristics usefully reveals
\which individuals or groups choose what" but does not uncover the main decision-making
channels nor can be used to answer counterfactual policy questions. Last but not least, while
counterfactual analysis relies on structural modeling, identication and estimation of structural
models from standard data requires strong non-testable assumptions.
My work addresses these issues directly by collecting new data on usually unobserved prim-
itives of a family decision process and by showing how such data can be used in the estimation
of a simple model of curriculum choice with uncertain outcomes and heterogeneous child-parent
decision-makings to achieve identication and make inference on families' choices. The paper
thus tackles some of the aims of existing research agendas on behavioral choice modeling (e.g.,
Ben-Akiva et al. (2002) and Adamowicz et al. (2008)), especially concerning decision making
under uncertainty (e.g., Manski (2004a, 2000)) and within the family (e.g., Dauphin et al.
(2010)).
In particular, I designed and conducted a survey gathering the following eld data from a
relatively large sample of Italian families:
(A) Children's and parents' probabilistic expectations before the choice, elicited on a 0-100
group. On the other hand, analysis of identication depends on the adopted framework.
2scale, over several in-high-school and post-diploma outcomes;
(B) Children's and parents' stated choice preferences before the choice (SP);
(C) Families' actual choices, or revealed preferences (RP);
(D) Self-reported family decision rules, including (1) unilateral decision by child (parents),
(2) choice by child (parents) after listening to the parents (child), and (3) child-parents
joint decision;3
(E) Orientation suggestions provided by junior high school teachers;
(F) Children's and families' background characteristics.
Then, within the theoretical framework previously outlined, I demonstrate how joint use of these
data can be employed to separately identify and estimate structural parameters capturing how
children and parents trade o dierent choice-relevant outcomes (preference or utility weights)
and parameters describing family decision rules (aggregation or protocol weights).4
Specically, with actual choices (C) observed, identication of the empirical model works
as follows. Under unilateral decisions (and under \unitary family" decision in the sense of
Becker (1981)), heterogeneity in decision makers' probabilistic expectations (A) identies utility
parameters, in the same fashion as alternatives- and decision makers-specic characteristics do
in standard random utility models with no uncertainty. Actual choices (C) and family members'
expectations (A), however, do not suce to separately identify preference and aggregation
parameters for families making a multilateral decision according to (D). To solve this problem,
I combine data (A) and (C) with family members' stated preferred alternatives (B), within
a stated preference-revealed preference (SP-RP) joint framework (e.g., Ben-Akiva et al. (1994)
and Hensher et al. (1999)). Intuitively, given data on family members' choice preferences,
utility weights are identied from heterogeneity in expectations (one SP individual choice model
for each family member with an \active" decision-making role); whereas, protocol weights are
identied from dierences between family members' individual choice preferences and families'
actual choices (one RP family model of multilateral decision making).
Thus, methodologically, my paper bridges an emerging literature in economics with a liter-
ature that has long developed mainly outside economics, in the elds of transportation, mar-
keting, and resource economics. The former is a stream of works employing \right-hand side"
probabilistic expectations data in models of individual choice under uncertainty to achieve or
improve identication of structural preference parameters (e.g., Delavande (2008), Arcidiacono
3Rule (1) holds that the child chooses by maximizing his subjective expected utility formed by his own preferences and
beliefs over outcomes' states. Rule (2) holds that the child chooses by maximizing a subjective expected utility formed by his
own preferences over outcomes' states and by beliefs updated to account for parental beliefs. Rule (3) holds that child's and
parent's preferences and beliefs over outcomes' states contribute to the nal choice via linear aggregation of the corresponding
expected utility components. A formal representation is provided in subsection 2.3.
4Notice that I can focus on curriculum demand because the Italian secondary system features open enrollment. That is,
lack of selectivity from the school side eliminates potential identication problems from the interplay of demand and supply
in producing observed choices.
3et al. (2011), and Zafar (2008) for static choices, and Erdem et al. (2005) and Mahajan and
Tarozzi (2011) for dynamic settings).5 The latter, originating from Morikawa (1989)'s original
work, suggests pooling SP and RP data together{a process called \data enrichment" or \data
fusion"{in order to exploit SP data to help identify parameters that RP data could not and,
thus, improve estimation eciency (see Louviere et al. (2000)'s state-of-the-art review). Both
streams of literature, however, have focused on unilateral decision making and, to the best of
my knowledge, the latter has never been used for analyzing group decisions with uncertain
outcomes.6
The empirical tool developed in this paper enables me to investigate the following descriptive
and normative issues of curriculum choice:
(I) What are the most important determinants of curriculum choice among future outcomes{
dened over children's \taste" for curricula, their ability and eort while in high school, and
post-graduation opportunities and choices{that are uncertain at the moment of curriculum
choice and are potentially relevant for it?
(II) Conditional on an interacted family decision rule, to what extent are parental beliefs
transmitted to children during the decision, and to what extent do parental preferences
aect the nal choice?
(III) How does curriculum enrollment respond to policy-induced changes of decision makers'
beliefs over outcomes' states? And is it important to account for child-parent decision
making and heterogeneous family rules for counterfactual analysis of curriculum choice?
I nd that preference or taste for curriculum core subjects is systematically the most valued
factor by both children and parents and across families using dierent decision rules. Whereas
the importance of other in-high-school outcomes relative to post-diploma ones (e.g., school
achievement and eort relative to exible college-work and college major choices) is heteroge-
neous across groups (issue I).
Estimates of the model with heterogeneous decision rules reveal that children incorporate
parents' beliefs into their own when making the choice at least partially and to an extent that
varies across outcomes (issue II, family rule 2). For instance, children appear to trust
parental opinion regarding their ability better than their own, assigning a larger weight to the
former. On the other hand, the aggregation weights on the exibility that dierent curricula
will provide in the subsequent choice of eld in college and the aggregation weights on child's
preference for subjects favor children's opinions, although equal weights cannot be rejected for
the latter outcome.
5Other recent papers have used expectations data as equilibrium outcomes in discrete choice with social interactions (Li and
Lee, 2009) and, on the \left-hand side," as a response variable for choice experiments under incomplete scenarios (Blass et al.,
2010), to improve estimation eciency (e.g., van der Klaauw (2000)), and to identify unobserved heterogeneity in dynamic
settings (Pantano and Zheng, 2010).
6Dosman and Adamowicz (2006) are a partial exception in that they use SP-RP methods to examine household vacation
site choice with inter-spouses bargaining, but their setting does not feature uncertainty nor heterogeneous decision processes.
4Comparison of children's and parents' stated choice preferences with actual choices for fami-
lies in which child and parent(s) make a joint decision supports group rationality, with less than
5% of families selecting an individually dominated choice. Moreover, parameters' estimates for
this group suggest a substantial inuence of parental preferences on curriculum choice (issue
II, family rule 3). For instance, the weight on the child's expected utility component of taste
for subjects is smaller than 1/3, and a weight of 1/2 is statistically rejected. That is, parents
may be trying to prevent children from overweighting their own preferences for subjects in high
school relative to other outcomes that will realize at a later time in their future. On the other
hand, the aggregation weights on the exibility that dierent curricula will provide when chil-
dren face the college eld choice and those concerning the possibility of nding a liked job after
graduation favor children's preferences. Nonetheless, weights' heterogeneity across outcomes is
not statistically signicant, and a unique weight of approximately 1/3 on the child's expected
utility cannot be rejected.
I use the models' estimates to simulate counterfactual scenarios in which changes in indi-
viduals' beliefs{generated by \awareness" campaigns, publication of education statistics, and
policies altering curricular specialization and standards{aect curriculum enrollment (issue
III). For instance, simulation of a 0.1 increase in individuals' probabilities of enjoying math
and science in the general scientic curriculum following an awareness campaign about those
subjects shows that the large utility weight families attach to the child's taste for subjects im-
plies a potentially large impact of this kind of policies on curriculum enrollment. Altering access
to university based on children's graduation curriculum has also a large impact on response,
as opposed to providing information on curriculum graduation rates and on subsequent college
enrollment for previous cohorts.
As for heterogeneity of family decision rules, the unitary-family benchmark and the proposed
model with heterogeneous rules generate intuitive and qualitatively similar predictions that,
nonetheless, are quantitatively dierent. In particular, the counterfactual exercises reveal that
identity of policy recipients matters for enrollment response and underlines the importance of
incorporating decision makers' beliefs and decision rules when evaluating policies. For instance,
assuming a unitary model with parents as representative decision makers sizeably overestimates
the magnitude of enrollment response to awareness and desensitization campaigns implied by the
heterogenous model; whereas a unitary model based on children's expectations generates much
closer predictions. Moreover, counterfactual enrollment responses decomposed by decision-
making rule and by targeted group suggest that publication of education statistics would have
a larger impact on children reporting unilateral decision by self than on the other children,
and that if parents only were aware of policies changing institutional features of tracking, the
impact of such policies may be much smaller than if children, too, were informed.
While direct observation of family members' probabilistic beliefs and decision rules makes
5modeling expectations and assuming a particular decision-making unit unnecessary{a main
strength of my analysis{it should be clear nonetheless that the approach I explore with this
work does not mean to nor can eliminate the need of assumptions altogether. Rather, it
transfers their locus from things researchers do not know to be true nor can usually test, i.e.,
the behavioral process, to elements over which they may have some control or at least better
information, i.e., the collection and properties of the data. Thus, for example, I take data
on expectations and family decision rules at face value. Trusting the reader's patience and
hoping to achieve greater transparency, however, I defer a more thorough discussion of these
and related aspects, including potential limitations, to the body of the paper{where they can
be more conveniently related to the formal setup{and to the concluding session{where I briey
summarize them and identify areas of future work.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 conceptualizes child, parent, and family choice
problems, and illustrates the main identication and policy issues through a simplied example
with two decision rules, two alternatives, and two binary outcomes. Section 3 covers the study
design and describes the samples used in the empirical analysis of section 4. Section 5 presents
the counterfactual policy exercises. Section 6 relates the paper to the literature. Conclusions
follow.
2 The Identication Problem, Idealized
2.1 Curriculum Choice under Uncertainty
Setup. The environment is populated with families, f = 1;:::;F 2 F, each one formed by
one adolescent child, c = c(f), and one parent, p = p(f). Families face high school curriculum
choice for their children over a common set of available alternatives, j = 1;:::;J 2 J, and wish




where cj is the quality of the match between child c and curriculum j. This parameter should
be thought of as multidimensional, encompassing both quality of curriculum choice during high
school and opportunities and choices after graduation. Examples are whether the child would
enjoy the core subjects, how his academic performance would be, and which opportunities and
choices would he face after graduation, should he enroll in curriculum j.
Families are likely to perceive most if not all components of cj as uncertain at the mo-
ment of the choice. Assuming separability of cj's components yields a convenient repre-
sentation of uncertainty as a set of binary outcomes, B = fbn 2 f0;1ggN
n=1, with corre-
sponding objective ex-ante realization probabilities, fcj (bn 2 f0;1g)gn=1;:::;N;j=1;:::;J, such that
6cj (bn = 1) = 1   cj (bn = 0). Hence cj can be expressed as a function of such probabili-





, with j = 1;:::;J. In fact, I assume that family members hold
subjective probabilistic beliefs, fPij (bn 2 f0;1g)gn=1;:::;N;j=1;:::;J with i 2 fc;pg, which may or
may not coincide with the objective ones and based on which they form estimates of cj, i.e.,





. Hence, to clarify, cjn = cj (bn = 1) indicates the objective ex-ante prob-
ability that outcome bn = 1 occurs if child c attends curriculum j; whereas, Pijn = Pij (bn = 1)
indicates the subjective probability held by family member i 2 fc;pg for the same outcome.
Finally, in my notation, individuals' indices indicate individual-specic variables or param-
eters, when used as subscripts; they indicate variables or parameters specic to the class of
individuals identied by the index, when used as superscripts.
Assumptions. Before moving to the example, I wish to make the assumptions underlying
the described framework more transparent and to provide motivations for them. Whenever
warranted, I will defer further discussions to later sections.
First, I assume dyadic families because data on beliefs and stated choice preferences were
collected for one parent only. Theoretically, this is equivalent to assuming that parental role
in the choice can be represented through primitives of a single parent, the \representative"
or \relevant" parent. Inclusion of both parents into the framework would be conceptually
straightforward, as it will become clear in subsections 2.3 and 4.2.
Second, based on the institutional features relevant for the empirical analysis, the supply
side is characterized (1) by curricular tracking with physically separate curricula (i.e., oered
by dierent schools) and (2) by an open enrollment system in which the allocation mechanism
of children to curricula and schools is family choice.7 On the demand side, I assume (3) a
hierarchical process of (a) selection of a family decision rule, (b) curriculum choice, and (c)
school choice, as well as (4) separability of curriculum choice from other family choices. (1)
and (2) allow me to focus on the demand side; (3) and (4) allow me to analyze curriculum
choice in isolation. While I discuss separability of family decision rule and curriculum choice
later in the paper, separability of curriculum choice from school choice is supported by the fairly
homogeneous quality of Italian public schools, to which I restrict in the empirical analysis.
Third, I assume that all families face the same \universal set" of alternatives and that they
use it as their choice set for curriculum choice. The former assumption is warranted for my
empirical analysis, since the size of the area where the data were collected, the schools' location
within the area, and the characteristics of the public transport network make all curricula
available to everybody (see Giustinelli (2010, Chpt. 2) for details). On the other hand, the latter
assumption{commonly made in empirical applications{excludes the possibility of heterogeneous
non-compensatory processes of \consideration set" formation. Later I will identify this aspect
7See section 6 for a short summary about curricular stratication in Italy and other OECD countries or Giustinelli (2010,
Chpt. 2) for a more detailed one.
7as an interesting candidate for further work, as it constitutes an additional channel through
which parents and teachers may aect children's curriculum choice.
Finally, choice of modeling uncertainty as a set of separable binary outcomes is purely dic-
tated by feasibility of data collection so that, for each respondent i 2 fc;pg, fPij (bn = 1)gn=1;:::;N;j=1;:::;J
are elicited in place of the more complicated objects fPij (b1;:::;bN)gj=1;:::;J. Notice also that
if multiple discrete or continuous outcomes were included, multiple points of the respondents'
distributions of beliefs should be elicited for each outcome and alternative.
A 222 Example. Throughout the section, I illustrate the framework and the identi-
cation problem via a simple example with 2 alternatives, 2 outcomes, 2 family decision
rules or \protocols," and 1 family. The family must choose between the art curriculum,
\Michelangelo" (M), and the math-and-science curriculum, \Galileo" (G), by weighing a \Dif-
culty" outcome (D){that the child will graduate from high school in the regular time{and
a \Flexibility" outcome (F){that the training he receives in high school will allow him to
choose among a wide range of elds in college. An M-diploma would be easier to obtain
for this child than a G-diploma: cMD = 95 > cGD = 70 (math at Galileo is really
hard!). However, an M-diploma would provide him with less exibility than a G-diploma:
cMF = 30 < cGF = 90 (Michelangelo's artistic training is somewhat narrow and suit-
able only for studying architecture or some art-related eld in college). Family members
hold subjective assessments, f(PiMD;PiMF);(PiGD;PiGF)gi2fc;pg, of the objective probabili-
ties, f(MD;MF);(GD;GF)g = f(95;30);(70;90)g, and use the former within one of the
following decision processes: either the child unilaterally chooses his own curriculum or child
and parent make a joint decision.
2.2 The Individual Problem: Separating Preferences and Beliefs
Analysis of the individual curriculum choice problem{as faced by a single family member o by
a unitary decision-making unit{introduces the challenge of empirically separating the decision
maker's preferences from his/her beliefs.
The Child Problem. Faced with the curriculum choice problem, the child selects the cur-
riculum that maximizes ^ cj over J, according to decision rule (1). I operationalize this idea







Pcj (bn)  u(bn;zc) + x0




n +  Uc + x0
cjc + "cj; (2)
8which is a function of the vector of uncertain outcomes, b = (b1;:::;bN), of a M  1 vector of
child-curriculum specic attributes not subject to uncertainty, xcj = (xcj1;:::;xcjM)
0, of a vector
of individual characteristics, zc, and of a random term unobservable to the econometrician, "cj.
Being constant over alternatives,  Uc =
PN
n=1 u(bn = 0;zc) drops out of the choice.
Each structural preference parameter, uc
n = u(bn = 1;zc)   u(bn = 0;zc), represents the
dierence in utility that a child with characteristics zc derives from occurrence of outcome n
(i.e., bn = 1), relative to its non-occurrence (i.e., bn = 0). Hence, these parameters combine
within a simple compensatory framework the dierent components of cj, and should not be
confused with the child's \choice preference" (i.e., his preferred alternative as implied by his
underlying utility) nor with his \preference or taste for subjects" (i.e., a specic component
of his utility function). In particular, while the child may not perfectly know his taste for
subjects beforehand{indeed he holds subjective beliefs about it{the compensatory rule he uses
to trade o dierent outcomes reects his preferences over outcomes' states at the moment of
the choice.8
Linearity of expected utility implies risk-neutrality. However, sociological evidence suggests
that some children prefer curricula that{they believe{will enable them to \insure" against the
presently uncertain outcomes of their future college and work choices, i.e., to \postpone" those
choices.9 Indeed, economic theory has shown that risk aversion can generate preference for
exibility both in presence and in absence of learning over time (Ficco and Karamychev, 2009).
To account for this aspect, albeit in a somewhat \reduced form" fashion, in the empirical model
I include children's perception of the degree of exibility that dierent curricula would give to
them in the future choices of college versus work and of college major.
Example (continued). Let us assume that the family is observed (by an econometrician) to
choose alternative M. Furthermore, let us momentarily assume that the family decision protocol,
e.g., unilateral decision by the child according to \ Max
j2fM;Gg
EUcj = PcjD ucD +PcjF ucF,"
is also observed. Even within this simple setup, the researcher is faced with multiple competing
explanations consistent with choice of M. The following two scenarios illustrate the identication
problem and its relevance for policy.
 Scenario I: The child holds rational expectations, i.e., f(PcMD;PcMF);(PcGD;PcGF)g =
8Of course, preferences for outcomes realizing far ahead in time may dier from current preferences because of discounting
and/or time inconsistency. However, I do not incorporate these aspects in the model, since my data would not enable me to
identify the corresponding parameters. See Mahajan and Tarozzi (2011) for a recent paper using expectations data to identify
time preferences with heterogeneous time inconsistency.
9\I chose this school because beyond giving me this training [learning some foreign languages] ... afterwards I would like
to study law in college. But should anything happen to me, [with this diploma] I can still get a job in a travel agency... Not
everything is lost! It [this school] will provide me with several job opportunities." (a girl attending a vocational school for
tourism) (Istituto IARD, 2001, p.38) And her mother agrees \Perhaps, once A. has gotten her diploma she may change her
mind, and decide she does not wish to go to college after all... Yet, [thanks to this training] she will hold a diploma that will
enable her to nd a job. A piece of paper is chased!" (Istituto IARD, 2001, p.38) On the other hand, a boy condent that he
will go to college comments \I knew I would go to college and I could do well in any type of general high school. Then, they
[the parents] said `The scientic curriculum is better because you will have more options afterwards.' That is, it is a school
that will enable me to choose among a large number of elds in college."(Istituto IARD, 2001, p.39)
9f(95;30);(70;90)g, and only cares about diculty, e.g., fucD;ucFg = f10;0g. With a
linear compensatory rule trading o diculty and exibility, this conguration of prefer-
ences and beliefs implies EUcM = 95  10 + 30  0 > EUcG = 70  10 + 90  0.
 Scenario II: The child holds rational expectations on diculty, but he erroneously per-
ceives the two alternatives as providing the same degree of exibility, e.g., f(PcMD;PcMF);
(PcGD;PcGF)g = f(95;90);(70;90)g. Moreover, he equally cares about diculty and exi-
bility, e.g., fucD;ucFg = f5;5g. This yields EUcM = 955+905 > EUcG = 705+905.
Under the standard assumption that individual preferences (i.e., the utility weights) are
hardwired and cannot be manipulated, scenario I (a preference-driven choice) has dierent
policy implications than scenario II (an expectation-driven choice). Specically, if a policy
maker were to intervene by providing the child with the correct information{optimistically
assuming that the policy maker knows it{his policy would be potentially eective only under
the second scenario. That is, if the now informed decision maker of scenario II were to
\comply" and used the disclosed objective realization probabilities, he would switch to choice
of G (since 95  5 + 30  5 < 70  5 + 90  5). Under scenario I, instead, the decision maker will
choose M even without holding rational expectations, as long as he does not value exibility
and he correctly perceives M as an easier alternative.
The Parent Problem. I assume that parents put themselves in their children's shoes{
meaning that they solve the same problem as their children do{but do it through their own
lenses{i.e., through their own subjective expectations and preference weights. This echoes Bisin
and Verdier (2001)'s assumption of parental \imperfect empathy," and implies that the parental
problem can be formalized as in (2), substituting the individual index c with p.
2.3 Group Decision Making: Separating Members' Preferences, Beliefs, and
Decision Rule
The Family Problem. A family-level decision process for curriculum choice may consist of
a unilateral decision by a single family member or may entail interactions among members.10
Specifying a particular form of interaction requires knowledge or assumptions on whether,
which, and how family members' beliefs and preferences enter the process, and on whether and
10Becker (1981, p. 298) reasons, \Of course children (in modern times, especially adolescents) may believe that they do
know enough and that their parents are out of touch with important changes (...) The conict with older children is usually
less severe, and altruistic parents are more willing simply to contribute dollars that children can spend as they wish (...)
[This conict] means that a common utility function for the family does not exist; dierent members maximize dierent utility
functions." For instance, a girl of the Istituto IARD (2001)'s study narrates, \They never wished to inuence me too much,
I think because, should it turn out that the choice they imposed is a mistake, they would regret it! Hence, they let me free."
(Istituto IARD, 2001, p.63) While a mother says, \I liked such a clear idea, and I agreed!" (Istituto IARD, 2001, p. 59), with
reference to the fact that her son provided a clear supporting argument for his choice. And yet, another girl explains, \My
mom wanted me to attend the artistic high school, and my father the accounting track. But I chose a school that will train me
to become a teacher, instead. Thus, I gave them both the sack." (Istituto IARD, 2001, p. 61)
10how the choice set and other constraints are modied by the interaction itself.11
Set the latter issue aside, a fairly general formalization of a cooperative decision process
under uncertainty, nesting unilateral decision and other collective processes as special cases,
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Hence, child and parent update their subjective beliefs, fffPijngN
n=1gJ
j=1gi2fc;pg, to account for







respectively. And they maximize a weighted average of their thus updated subjective expected










denotes family members' preference over outcomes (dependence of the preference parameters on
individual characteristics is suppressed for notational convenience), and f"k
fjgM
m=1 is a random
component capturing the observational diculty of the econometrician.
Example (continued). For the sake of the example let us now assume that whenever child
and parent make a collective decision, they solve
max
j2fM;Gg
c  [PcjD  ucD + PcjF  ucF] + p  [PpjD  upD + PpjF  upF]:




n g  f1;1g, c
n  c 8n, and p = 1   c.
It is then easy to concoct a third scenario in which, choosing according to this rule, child and
parent select once again M.
 Scenario III: The parent has more say than the child in the choice, e.g., fc;pg =
f1=3;2=3g. They both care equally about diculty and exibility, e.g., fucD;ucFg 
fupD;upFg = f5;5g. The child has rational expectations, i.e., f(PcMD;PcMF);(PcGD;
PcGF)g = f(95;30);(70;90)g, while the parent erroneously perceives M and G as providing





[95  5 + 30  5]+
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3
[95  5 + 90  5] > EUfG =
1
3
[70  5 + 90  5]+
1
3
[70  5 + 90  5]:
11For example, in Cosconati (2011)'s model of parenting style and human capital formation the parent places constraints
on the child's leisure time, thereby aecting his eort's possibility set in doing homework.
11The latter example shows how knowledge of decision process dynamics, like presence or
absence of interpersonal interactions, is also fundamental to inform policy. In this case, for
information provision to be meaningful in the rst place, it should target the parent. Fur-
thermore, assessing whether disclosing certain information may be at all eective and to what
extent{which a policy maker may wish to know given that information provision is generally
costly{requires knowledge of the relative importance of each participant and of her/his prefer-
ences. For instance, in scenario III protocol and preference weights are such that disclosure of




[95  5 + 30  5] +
2
3
[95  5 + 30  5] <
1
3
[70  5 + 90  5] +
2
3
[70  5 + 90  5]:
But this need not be the case in general.
Let us nally consider a situation in which child and parent are perfectly aligned and
both prefer M, based on the wrong perception that it provides the same degree of exibil-
ity as G, i.e., fucD;ucFg  fupD;upFg = f5;5g and f(PcMD;PcMF);(PcGD;PcGF)g 
f(PpMD;PpMF);(PpGD;PpGF)g = f(95;90);(70;90)g. Hence, they should be \indierent" among
dierent decision rules{at least within the class of models satisfying unanimity{since any fam-
ily decision rule linearly combining their expected utilities, including f0;1g and f1;0g, would
result in choice of M given the primitives. Nevertheless, knowing which rule is employed in
the choice will generally be important for a policy maker. Assume he does not. Then, if the
family decision process is such that the child chooses unilaterally (as in scenario II), providing
the correct information may be useful. If, instead, the process entails weighting child's and
parent's expected utilities with weights 1/3 and 2/3 (as in scenario III), targeting the child
alone would not be eective, since
1
3
[95  5 + 30  5] +
2
3
[95  5 + 90  5] >
1
3
[70  5 + 90  5] +
2
3
[70  5 + 90  5];
however, targeting the parent alone or both may be, e.g.,
1
3
[95  5 + 90  5] +
2
3
[95  5 + 30  5] <
1
3
[70  5 + 90  5] +
2
3
[70  5 + 90  5]:
Heterogeneous Family Protocols. In the empirical application, I focus on the following
three main family rules observed in my data, all nested in (3).
 Child chooses unilaterally (k = 1). When a child chooses individually without major
interactions with his parents, the family criterion function,  1, coincides with the child's
expected utility (2). This protocol includes the possibility that the child interacts with
any person or listens to any source dierent from his parents, and is nested in (3) with
w
c;1
n = 1 and c
n = 1 8n.
12 Child chooses after listening to the parent (k = 2). I formalize this rule as one











n=1. This process is also nested in (3) with c
n = 1 8n. In turn, it nests
protocol k = 1 with w
c;2
n = 1 8n.
 Child and parent make a joint decision (k = 3). This process is a special case
of (3) with w
c;3
n = 1 and w
p;3
n = 1 for all n, i.e., a joint decision involving by-outcome





n 8n, k = 3 does nest k = 2. In such a case c
n are eectively weights
incorporating parental expectations, i.e., c
n = w
c;3
n for all n.
As a nal note, it should be made clear that without an explicit model of family rule's




n=1 in protocol 2 will generally capture child's internalization of parental opinions and
suggestions, such parameters may in turn depend on aspects of parental socialization decisions
and style (see Bisin et al. (2004) and references therein for relevant discussions).
3 Survey and Data
3.1 Study Design and Sample Characteristics
Study participants were sampled with a choice-based design, i.e., randomly within choices (see,
e.g., Manski and McFadden (1981)), from the population of all 9th graders entering any public
high school of the Municipality of Verona, Italy in September 2007 and their parents (4,189
families in total). Children's participation reached almost 100% of the targeted sample, for a
total of 1,215 students. Albeit lower as expected ( 60%), parental participation was good
for this type of surveys.12 In the empirical analysis I focus on the 1,029 participating families
whose children had just enrolled in high school for the rst time when the survey took place.
Tables 1 and 2 show the 2007-2008 distributions of curriculum enrollment in the population
and in the estimation samples and basic break-downs by children's and parents' characteristics
(for a detailed description of the original samples see Giustinelli (2010, Chpt. 2)).
Children completed a paper-and-pencil questionnaire in school during a class time slot (
50-60 minutes), assisted by an interviewer and the teacher of the subject scheduled for that
class. The parent questionnaire, also paper-and-pencil, was instead self administered at home
12Average parental participation, however, masks some dierences across parents' groups. For instance, participation rates
among parents of children that reported unilateral decision by self are lower than average. That is, whatever the underlying
reason for these parents not to participate in their children's choice{either a deliberate parenting style or disengagement{
they also appear to be the same parents that did not participate in the survey. This is not problematic here, since parental
expectations and stated choice preferences are used only for estimation of k = 2 and k = 3 models, whose subsamples have
the highest parental participation (up to 80%). On the other hand, this response pattern would indeed be troublesome if one
wished to use the data to analyze family rule selection.
13during the following 7-10 days and returned to the school in a sealed envelope for collection.
The format and administration modes were chosen to maximize participation and facilitate
administration inside the schools.
Two important design features were collection of eld (as opposed to \experimental") data
and use of a retrospective (as opposed to a prospective) approach. Choice of the former was
grounded on the high-stakes and once-and-for-all nature of curriculum choice that could be
hardly simulated or manipulated experimentally (see Dosman and Adamowicz (2006) for a
general discussion). As for the retrospective approach, it is the only sensible one within the
context of a cross-sectional data collection. First and foremost, actual choices are observed
by design and can thus be combined with expectations data. Second, respondents can provide
their probabilistic expectations and stated choice preferences with reference to the most relevant
point in time{a relatively recent past before the decision was made{that is likely to vary across
families and would therefore be hard to capture for everybody within a prospective framework.
The obvious downside is that this approach relies on respondents' capability to unbiasedly
recall their expectations and choice preferences before the choice. (For further details on design
decisions and for complete English translations of child and parent questionnaires see Giustinelli
(2010, Chpt. 2).)
3.2 Subjective Data
Reported Family Decision Rules. Child and parent perceptions of their family decision
rule were elicited by means of the following question, here directed to the child. In the actual
survey, however, in order to minimize any inuence on respondents' recall and report of their
beliefs and choice preferences, the battery of questions concerning the roles of family members
in the choice were placed after the expectations and stated preference battery.
Which one of the following statements best describe the WAY in which the CHOICE of
high school curriculum for you was made in your family? Please mark one only.
(A) We realized pretty soon that in our family we had the SAME IDEA 
(B) We DISCUSSED within our family till we reached a COMMON DECISION
based on some COMPROMISE 
ONLY ONE PERSON took the nal decision, AFTER RECEIVING INFORMATION
from the others and/or AFTER LISTENING to their OPINIONS
Indicate who decided:
(C) Myself 
(D) My father 
(E) My mother 
(F) Other person, specify: ....................................... 
14ONLY ONE PERSON made the nal decision, WITHOUT discussing
or exchanging OPINIONS with others
Indicate who decided:
(G) Myself 
(H) My father 
(I) My mother 
(L) Other person, specify: ....................................... 
The design is similar to that of analogous questions in existing large-scale surveys. Indeed,
this kind of information can be usefully incorporated in economic models of intra-household
behaviors (Friedberg and Webb (2006) and Cosconati (2011) are recent examples using the
Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997
(NLSY97) respectively), although it is subject to the criticism that response categories are
somewhat stylized and prone to subjective interpretation. Alternatively, numeric measures of
\decision-making inuence" are commonly used outside economics (e.g., Aribarg et al. (2002)
elicit inuence from respondents using a 0-100 scale). However, it is not necessarily obvious
that qualitative dierences between group decision processes can be mapped directly into quan-
titative dierences and elicited as such.
Answers to the decision protocol question and to a follow-up question eliciting identities of
the persons the decision maker talked to were then used to classify reported family rules into
the three processes formalized in subsection 2.3.13 Table 1 shows the sample distribution of
family decision rules reported by children: either the child chose unilaterally ( 27%), or he
chose after listening to his parent(s) ( 35%), or child and parent made a joint decision (
38%). The fraction of families for which no rule or a dierent rule was reported was below 5%
and dropped from the sample.14
Insofar as parents are generally thought to play a substantial role in curriculum choice,
these numbers may look surprising. However, a comparison of children's and parents' stated
choice preferences with the actual choices made by families reveals that only 14% of children
did not have their own way versus 40% of parents (see tables 3 and 4). This is consistent
with recent evidence on parenting and children's decision-making development that scholars
have interpreted as an instance of the more general shift of Western parenting style in the
13Child chooses unilaterally (k = 1) includes the case in which he talked to any person dierent from his parents and, hence,
it groups part of (C) and all (G). Child chooses after listening to the parent (k = 2) covers part of (C). Child and parent
make a joint decision (k = 3) includes (A) and (B). Parent chooses after listening to the child (say, k = 4) includes part
of (D) and (E). Parent chooses unilaterally (say, k = 5) includes the case in which she talked to any person dierent from
the child (part of (D) and (E)) and that in which she chooses without any major interactions with others ((H) and (I)).
Additionally, when either (A) or (B) was selected, the respondent was asked a follow-up question eliciting the identity of the
\threat decision maker," i.e., the decision maker in the counterfactual situation in which no agreement or compromise could
be reached. Answers to this question and other information were used to dene the \relevant" or \representative" parent.
14Following empirical studies of parenting in developmental psychology and economics, I base my analysis on children's
reports of family decision rule. In my case this choice is especially warranted by the fact that administration of the student
questionnaire was interviewer-assisted (as opposed to the parent questionnaire that was self-administered) and enables me to
avoid issues related to selection in parental participation.
15last few decades towards a more open \aective and supportive" approach than the previous
\prescriptive and rigid" one (Provantini and Arcari, 2009). Alternatively, parents{especially
those with a higher socio-economic background and education{may just be \nudging" their
children's choices in more subtle ways (similar to the rearing style of American middle-class
parents according to Lareau (2003)).
Stated Preferences and Junior High School Orientation. Respondents' stated prefer-
ences were elicited by means of the following question, here reported with the wording used for
the child questionnaire. With the aim of making their individual pre-decision beliefs salient to
respondents when answering this question, in the actual questionnaire the question was placed
immediately after the battery of expectations questions used to estimate the behavioral models
(described in the paragraph \Probabilistic Expectations" below).
Try and think about your situation last year, when you where still attending your third
year of junior high school. [In the common introductory paragraph to expectations and stated
preference questions.] Please, RANK the following curricula from YOUR most preferred
one to the one you like the least, considering only YOUR preferences, expectations, and
the criteria YOU considered important for choosing among them. Start by assigning 1
to YOUR FAVORITE curriculum, then proceed by increments of 1 till YOUR LEAST
preferred one. The same number may not be assigned to two dierent schools.
Curriculum (either standard or laboratory) Rank
Vocational - Commerce
Vocational - Industrial






General - Learning or Social Sciences
General - Math and Sciences
Hence, for example, the survey task of a k = 2 child would entail retrieving his probabilistic
beliefs and his curriculum ranking (corresponding to those beliefs) before the choice, i.e., net
of any updating based on parental inputs.
In fact, set measurement issues aside, child and parent stated choice preferences will generally
not coincide with the family actual choices due to child-parent interaction in decision making.
In table 3, the proportion of families in which the nal choice does not coincide with the child's
stated preferred alternative is approximately 13-14% (columns 1 and 2). This gure is intuitively
smallest among families whose children reported making a unilateral decision (column 3), and
it increases slightly among families employing multilateral decision rules (columns 4 and 5). On
16the other hand, actual choices and parents' stated choice preferences do not coincide in 40% of
families (table 4). This percentage is, once again intuitively, highest among families in which
children reported making a unilateral choice and decreases conditional on more cooperative
protocols.
Admittedly, actual choices and children's stated top-ranked alternatives do not coincide even
for the 11% of families whose children reported unilateral (self) decision (see table 3). Taking
the reported choice protocols at face value, this pattern may be explained by the existence of
some factors or constraints that aected the actual decision but were not accounted for in the
stated preference task (called \prominence" in the literature). For instance, gures in table 5
show that in about 60% of the cases in which child's SP and RP do not coincide, the latter does
coincide with the orientation suggestion provided by junior high school teachers of the child.
Hence, one possibility is that, when reporting their choice preferences, some children abstracted
from the role that such a suggestion had in their choice. In the empirical analysis of section 4
I explore this possibility.
A separate interesting question is whether families employing joint decision making select
undominated alternatives, given individual members' choice preferences. Table 6 shows that
cooperative families fail to select an undominated alternative in less than 5% of cases in my
sample, thereby supporting \group rationality."
Probabilistic Expectations. From anecdotal and sociological evidence on curriculum choice
in Italy (Istituto IARD, 2001, 2005), I identied a set of outcomes, listed in the table below,
potentially important for this choice. Hence, after being prompted to think back to the previous
year before a nal discussion and a nal choice had been made, respondents were asked to report
on a 0-100 percent chance scale their subjective probabilities, fPijngi2fc;pg, that outcomes
n = 1;:::;N would realize under the alternative scenarios that the child were to attend each
curriculum j = 1;:::;J of his choice set.15
15An additional question attempted to elicit children's expected earnings at age 30 under the two alternative scenarios that
they would start working immediately after graduation and that they would rst obtain a college degree. However, response
rates for these question were low, especially among children. Many of them did admit that they had no sense whatsoever of the
order of magnitude of a monthly salary. A minority provided answers based either on information received during orientation
in junior high school or on their knowledge of their parents' earnings. As for parents, a number of them left written notes on
the survey instrument explaining that, beyond the diculty of providing any meaningful forecast, they did not regard such
a factor as particularly important for the choice. Be as it may, low response rates for these questions prevented inclusion of
expected income in the empirical specication of child's and parent's expected utility functions.
17Outcome Description
bj1 = 1 \Like": The child will enjoy the core subjects of curriculum j.
bj2 = 1 \Ability-Eort I": In curriculum j the child will spend  2.5h a day
studying or doing homework.
bj3 = 1 \Ability-Eort II": The child will graduate from curriculum j
in any length of time.
bj4 = 1 \Ability-Eort III": The child will graduate from curriculum j
in the regular time.
bj5 = 1 \Ability-Eort IV": The child will graduate from curriculum j
in the regular time and with a yearly GPA  7.5.
bj6 = 1 \Peers": Attending curriculum j will enable the child to be in school
with his best friend(s).
bj7 = 1 \Flexibility I": Attending curriculum j will enable the child to face
a exible college-work choice by providing him with a suitable training
both for some university eld(s) and for work in some liked occupation(s).
bj8 = 1 \College": The child will enroll in college, conditional on graduating
from curriculum j.
bj9 = 1 \Flexibility II": Attending curriculum j will enable the child to face
a exible choice of eld in college, i.e., to choose among a wide range
of elds, conditional on graduating from j and on going to college.
bj10 = 1 \Work": The child will nd an acceptable and liked job after graduating
from curriculum j.
bj11 = 1 \Parent(s)": The child will make his parent(s) happy by attending curriculum j.
(Asked to the child only.)
As an illustration, I focus on the \objective outcome" bj5, which is one of special interest
since respondents' probabilistic beliefs about its realization can be taken as their estimates of
the child's curriculum j-specic ability combined with his eort.
For each curriculum listed below, please, answer the following percent chance question:
Last year, when you were still attending your third year of junior high school, what did
you think would be your percent chances of maintaining an YEARLY GPA of 7.5 or
HIGHER during your educational career, had you decided to attend that curriculum?
Figure 1 shows the distributions of responses for the vocational commerce and the general math-
and-science curricula in dierent estimation samples. As it is indeed observed in actuality (i.e,
based on realized students' GPAs, though not on their passing and graduation rates), children
perceive the general math curriculum as more dicult than the vocational commerce one. This
can be seen by comparing the two top histograms, as low probabilities of obtaining a high GPA
in general math feature higher response frequencies than the corresponding ones for vocational
commerce, and viceversa. Moreover, higher frequencies for probabilities above equal chances
in the parental distribution of beliefs for general math (bottom right histogram) than in their
children's distribution (bottom left histogram) are consistent with the common nding that
parents tend to be more optimistic regarding youths' future (positive) outcomes than youths
are (e.g., Fischho et al. (2000), Dominitz et al. (2001), and Attanasio and Kaufmann (2010)).
18A complete statistical description of expectations data is beyond the scope and space of this
paper, and can be found in Giustinelli (2010, Chpt. 2) for the original samples. There, I compare
moments of the sample distributions of probabilistic beliefs with local population statistics (and
with statistics from other studies) for outcomes for which such statistics are available (i.e., b2, b4,
b5, and b10). Despite substantial heterogeneity of beliefs across respondents and some evidence
of rounding and bunching at multiples of 5%, the mean and median responses match up fairly
well with the statistics used as comparisons, another typical nding in the literature employing
expectations data.
Unfortunately, beliefs on taste for subjects and on exibility of future choices cannot be
easily related to objective statistics. Nonetheless, for the exibility outcome b9 I was able to
compare respondents' subjective beliefs with enrollment rates in dierent groups of elds by
graduation curriculum, where I take high school curricula followed by more disperse enrollment
distributions across college elds as those providing more choice in the college eld decision.
Remarkably, subjective beliefs and statistics concord in identifying high school curricula that
provide more exibility: the general math-and-science curriculum and, independent of the track,
any technology-oriented curriculum.16
4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 The \Unitary Family" Benchmark
Econometric Model. I use actual choices (RP data) together with children's and, alter-
natively, parents' probabilistic expectations to estimate two versions of a \unitary family"
benchmark model of curriculum choice. In the rst, the child is the representative or relevant
decision maker (i.e., i  c(f)); in the second, such a role is taken by the parent (i.e., i  p(f)).
Assuming i.i.d. type-I extreme value random terms, the probability of observing child c from

































j is an alternative-specic constant measuring the average eect of all unincluded factors
and i is the scale parameter inversely related to the variance of the error terms. Given
the parametric assumptions for the random terms and after setting i
10 = 0 as a location




n=1 with i 2 fc;pg, are identied
up to the scale factor, i.
16While this exercise reveals that exibility and preferences for exibility are modeled in a somewhat reduced-form manner
(see Barber a et al. (2004) for the theory), eliciting subjective probabilistic beliefs over all possible study and work paths
following graduation from each high school curriculum in the choice set would have imposed an excessive response burden on
respondents in the context of the current study.
19In practice, statistical identication of utility parameters relies on heterogeneity of decision
makers' beliefs that function as alternative- and individual-specic attributes of the conditional
logit. Alternatively, under rational expectations, one could simply replace individual prob-
abilistic expectations with population averages disaggregated by individual characteristics, if
available. In fact, while estimation results from subjective expectations data could be easily
compared with those obtained imposing the assumption of rational expectations, the compari-
son would not provide a proper test for rational expectations, since there exist several reasons
why respondents may have expectations that dier from mean realizations in some population
or sub-population of reference. For instance, they may hold rational expectations but their
process may simply dier from the one characterizing the population taken as a reference by
the econometrician.17
Estimation of (4) from actual choices requires taking choice-based sampling into account. I
use Manski and Lerman (1977)'s weighted exogenous sampling maximum likelihood (WESML)
estimator (described in appendix A), on the ground that it is computationally tractable and pro-
vides a constrained best predictor of the discrete response even when the logit assumption is not
correct (Xie and Manski, 1989). This approach, however, requires knowledge of the population
enrollment shares for the school year 2007-2008 to calculate weights that make the likelihood
function behave asymptotically as under random sampling. I obtained this information from
the Provincial Agency for Education of Verona.
I additionally estimate (4) using children's and parents' stated preferences (SP data) as re-
sponse variables and compare the estimates thus obtained with those based on actual choices.18
In this case the sampling scheme can be thought of as equivalent to one of \intercept & follow"
with choice-based recruitment or interception. McFadden (1996) shows that for the basic case
without persistent heterogeneity across choice situations and for sole purpose of parameters'
estimation{as opposed to other population quantities whose recovery would still require re-
weighting{data from choice situations other than the interception can be treated in estimation
as if the sampling were random.19 This will naturally apply also to the joint SP-RP models
presented later, as made transparent by the formal framework for choice-based sampling with
17Delavande (2008) provides an illustration and further discussion on this point. On the other hand, Li and Lee (2009)
are able to test and reject rational expectations in the context of political voting with social interactions, where voters'
expectations are dened over the voting behaviors of the members of their reference group, demonstrating once again usefulness
of expectations data.
18It is important to clarify that estimates from the SP model should not necessarily be interpreted as strictly providing the
trade-os children and parents will respectively make under unilateral decision making, for this would require that members of
families employing multilateral decision rules (and non-decision makers of families using a unilateral rule) were presented with
a counterfactual stated choice scenario explicitly worded in terms of individual decision-making. And it would also require that
decision makers of families employing a unilateral decision rule were presented with a stated choice scenario making explicit
reference to the actual choice situation. Yet, since children's and parents' SPs were elicited through a task that encouraged
respondents to recall their beliefs and preferences before the family choice process took place, SP data will contain useful
information on individual preference structures of children and parents over outcomes' states.
19Notice also that because existing empirical evidence on SP models using ranking data supports signicant dierences
across rank levels, with decreasing stability of ranking information as the rank of an alternative decreases (BenAkiva et al.,
1991), I estimate the SP models using as an outcome variable the highest ranked curriculum only rather than the complete
ranking of alternatives.
20multiple data sources presented in appendix A.
Revealed Preferences. Estimates of preference parameters for the basic benchmark model
with actual choices are shown in table 7. Signicance levels are based on robust (\sandwich")
asymptotic standard errors derived by Manski and Lerman (1977). (I discuss their validity
for statistical inference with my data in appendix B.1.) All specications include alternative-
specic constants (estimates not shown for reasons of space), whose overall signicance is con-
rmed by a Likelihood Ratio (LR) test. The adjusted LR index reported in the bottom row
of the table measures the percent increase in the value of the log-likelihood calculated at the
parameters' estimates relative to its value under equal chances (i.e., no model), and it should
neither be interpreted as the R2 of a linear regression nor be used to compare specications
that are not estimated on the same sample of data.
Estimates from children's subjective expectations (columns 2-5) display the expected (posi-
tive) signs, perhaps with the exception of \average daily homework  2.5h" (b2), whose utility
coecient may rather be hypothesized to be negative. The most important outcome is \child
likes the subjects" (b1), whose coecient is approximately 2.5 times larger than that of \face a
exible college eld's choice" (b9), 3.5 times larger than that of \graduate in the regular time"
(b4), and approximately 5 times larger than those of \nd a liked job after graduation" (b10),
\attend college" (b8), and \face a exible college-work choice" (b7). Preference parameters for
these outcomes are all signicant at 1%, as opposed to that for \being in school with friends"
(b6) which, somewhat surprisingly, is barely signicant.20
Qualitative results do not change when \make parent happy" (b11) is introduced in column
3, although the outcome itself turns out to be the third most important one after \child likes the
subjects" and \face a exible college eld choice." Similarly, inclusion of a dummy capturing the
orientation suggestion by junior high school teachers (columns 4 and 5) induces only marginal
changes in the estimates, mostly by making the coecient of the homework time's outcome not
signicant.21 However, the corresponding utility coecient is signicant and approximately 4
times smaller in magnitude than that of \child likes the subjects." This is true despite the fact
that the information content of junior high school orientation suggestions should be incorpo-
rated in decision makers' expectations. Hence, it is possible that orientation suggestions aect
curriculum choice through additional channels, e.g., indirectly, through choice set formation or,
directly, through preferences over outcomes.22
20Notice that while beliefs about friends' choice behavior seems a potentially important variable to incorporate in a model
of curriculum choice, my model does not structurally allow for social interactions in the sense of Brock and Durlauf (2001).
21The orientation dummy is equal to 0 both when no suggestion was provided and when a track was suggested but no
curriculum was specied, and is equal to 1 otherwise. A version constraining the utility coecient of the suggestion indicator
to 0 when the child (parent) received a suggestion but declared it was not considered in the choice produced results identical
to the ones shown. Sample size of columns 4 and 5 is lower than that of columns 2 and 3 because of item non-response on the
orientation question.
22In fact, if the orientation suggestion consists of one or more specic alternatives a child may successfully pursue but lacks
detailed supporting motivations, families face an inferential problem similar to that faced by an econometrician trying to
21Columns 6-7 display estimates from analogous specications estimated using parental ex-
pectations. This model implies the same preference ranking over the most valued outcomes
as the model estimated using children's expectations, thereby conrming the similarity of chil-
dren's and parents' beliefs documented in a preliminary descriptive analysis (Giustinelli, 2010,
Chpt. 2).
To ease comparison between children's and parents' preference weights, columns 8-13 display
estimates from the same specications as in columns 2-7 but obtained from families in which
expectations were available for both child and parent. Since the estimated coecients measure
the product of preference weights, fui
ngN
n=1, and scale parameter, i, a quick way to check
whether preference weights are likely to be similar between children and parents is to compare
ratios (between pairs of outcomes) of coecients estimated from each group, since such ratios
are scale free.23 Overall, children's expectations appear to have more explanatory power on
actual choices than those of their parents, consistent with the descriptive evidence presented
in subsection 3.2 that children had a more important role in the choice. In fact, the higher
level of signicance of children's expectations for almost all outcomes may also suggest greater
underlying heterogeneity in preferences among children.
Stated Preferences. Table 8 shows estimation results from SP data. A comparison with
the corresponding estimates based on RP data (e.g., columns 5 of tables 7 and 8) reveals that
the relative importance of dierent outcomes implied by children's stated choice preferences
and by actual choices dier somewhat. For instance, outcomes related to future opportunities
and choices, such as nding a liked job after graduation and attending college, play a relatively
more important role in explaining stated preferences than actual choices, while the opposite is
true for some of the in-high-school outcomes, like graduating in the regular time. Moreover,
the model based on SP data detects positive preferences for being in school with friends, but
implies smaller weights on making parents happy and on the orientation suggestion.
For parents, too, the relative importance that the child will nd a liked job upon graduation
and that he will face a exible college-work choice are higher based on stated preferences (e.g.,
columns 7 of tables 8 and 7), while that of the orientation suggestion is lower. The coecient
on homework time is now intuitively negative but, curiously, only among parents (although not
statistically signicant). Moreover, parents do not seem to assign a signicantly positive weight
on their children being in school with friends based on their stated preferences.
recover decision makers' beliefs and preference parameters from choices. On the one hand, this implies that family members
may have only noisy measures of teachers' opinions available to update their own beliefs. On the other hand, if teachers were
to base their suggestions not only on children's abilities and aptitudes but also on children's intentions and choice preferences
inclusion of the orientation dummy would be problematic to start with.
23Estimates of preference parameters from children's and parents' expectations and for dierent samples may be also
evaluated and compared in terms of the change they imply in predicted choice probabilities when expectations for specic
outcomes and alternatives change marginally. These calculations are not shown for reasons of space, but are available upon
requests. On the other hand, high non-response rates to the expected earnings' questions prevent me from including that
variable and from making willingness-to-pay calculations based on its utility coecient.
22Overall, ratios of preference parameters for pairs of outcomes display some variability both
between children and parents and across data sources, suggesting that the corresponding dier-
ences in estimated coecients are not a pure artifact of heterogeneous variance of unobserved
factors across groups and data sources. Put dierently, under the assumption of no bias in SP
responses (discussed in appendix B.2.1), it seems reasonable to hypothesize that utility param-
eters estimated from actual choices and children's (or parents') expectations will capture both
preferences and decision-making interactions.
Moreover, as discussed in subsection 2.3, even when children and parents are aligned in
theirs beliefs, preferences, or both, prediction and counterfactual analysis still require that
family decisions be analyzed through a model that species the correct decision-making unit
and protocol. Therefore, motivated by this idea, in the next subsections I pool RP and SP
data together, and I exploit their distinct information contents together with information on
family decision rules to gain identication power and separate parameters describing the latter
from children's and parents' utility weights. Specically, I estimate a distinct discrete choice
model for each observed family decision rule, thus making the conceptual framework presented
in subsection 2.3 operational.
Heterogeneity. While I do necessarily impose restrictions on preference parameters between
SP and RP models within family decision protocols, I do not impose any restriction on preference
parameters across models describing dierent protocols. This is because child and parent
preference structures are likely to vary across families employing dierent decision rules, as
suggested by raw correlations between observed family protocols and actual choices in the
data.24
Preference heterogeneity between children and parents and across decision rules are the only
forms of systematic or observed heterogeneity I explore in this paper. Of course, it is possible
that preferences over outcomes' states vary with decision makers' characteristics, such as gender
and family background, and even with their beliefs. While there would be neither conceptual
nor computational diculties in introducing systematic heterogeneity by assuming a functional
form that species how individual characteristics enter the structural parameters, because of
the relatively small sample sizes available for estimation of the protocol-specic models relative
to the already large number of estimated parameters, I prefer not to pursue this line. This
notwithstanding, given the correlation pattern existing between family decision rules, actual
choices, and background characteristics, allowing for heterogeneous family rules will provide in
itself indirect evidence about preference heterogeneity across the latter.25
24In fact, imposing homogeneous preferences for children and parents across decision protocols would actually strengthen
identication, possibly allowing me to analyze empirically the more general model in (3). In such a case preference parameters
would be identied from variation in children's and parents' beliefs from k = 1 families, whereas beliefs' and preferences'
aggregation parameters would be respectively identied from dierences between stated preferences and actual choices of
k = 2 and k = 3 families. An obstacle to this approach, however, is that response rate is low among k = 1 parents.
25A discrete choice model may additionally feature forms of unobserved heterogeneity that, if present, will generate correla-
234.2 Heterogeneous Decision Protocols
4.2.1 Econometric Models
Child Chooses Unilaterally (k = 1). Taking information of family decision rules at face
value, if a child reports making curriculum choice without any interactions with his parents,
only his expectations and preferences are relevant for the nal choice. Hence, a rst natural
approach is to estimate children's preference parameters from their expectations and actual
choices (or/and stated preferences), as follows.
 Model with One Data Source. This model is formally equivalent to the unitary bench-
mark in (4), with i  c(f), but is estimated on the subsample of children that reported

















cj is i.i.d. type-I extreme value, with scale parameters t;1 and t 2 fRP;SPg.
Alternatively, SP and RP data can be combined to increase estimates' precision while gaining
insight on possible dierences between the two data generating processes.
 SP-RP Joint Model. The model is
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where j indexes actual choices (RP) and y indexes stated choice preferences (SP), with




cy are i.i.d. type-I extreme value, with scale parameters RP;1 and
c;SP;1 respectively. With no serial correlation between SP and RP error components, the
resulting log-likelihood of observing the RP-SP pair (j;y) is the sum of the log-likelihoods
of j and y, the former corrected for choice-based sampling (shown in appendix A).
The main dierence between (6) and (5) is that the common component of the systematic




n ) enables identication and estimation of the
SP-RP scales' ratio, 1 = c;SP;1=RP;1. Specically, because Var("
RP;1
fj ) = (1)2  Var("
SP;1
cy ),
estimate of 1 can be used to investigate whether the two sources of data have approximately
the same amount of random noise by testing 1 = 1. In turn, testing equality of the RP and
SP alternative-specic constants provides additional information on the relationship between
RP and SP unobservables, since they capture the average eects of all unobserved factors.
tion across the alternatives' random utility components and cause the i.i.d. assumption to fail. In appendix B.2.2 I discuss a
potential source of unobserved heterogeneity that is specic of SP-RP (and repeated SP and other logitudinal) settings, i.e.,
unobservable persistence across data sources.
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cy are i.i.d. type-I extreme value with scale parameters RP;2
and c;SP;2 and no serial correlation between SP and RP. Parent's preferences, instead, are












with h 2 J.
Children's preference weights, fu
c;2
n gN
n=1, are identied from variation in children's expecta-
tions, through the SP component of the model (c-SP,2). The equality constraints on preference
parameters between (c-SP,2) and (RP,2) and the add-to-one restrictions on the aggregation




RP model.26 In fact, whether one is able to pin these weights down with some precision will
generally depend on how much variability exists both in child-parent expectations' dierences
and between children's stated preferences and observed choices across families. Once again,
combination of SP and RP data yields identication of the SP-RP relative scale, 2.
Child and Parent Make a Joint Decision (k = 3). In this model child and parent aggre-
gate their expected utilities outcome by outcome but without distinction between expectations'
revision and negotiation over preferences. That is,
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ph are i.i.d. type-I extreme value with scale parameters
RP;3, c;SP;3, and p;SP;3 and no serial correlation across data sources. The identication
argument for (9) is analogous to that of (7), but it requires the additional restriction of equal
relative scales for (c-SP,3) and (p-SP,3).
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Children's preferences are displayed by decision protocol in tables 9, 10, and 12 and 13, which
also include estimates of the protocol weights. Whereas parents' preferences, shown in tables
11, 12, and 13, are estimated for groups k 2 f2;3g only, because of low participation of k = 1
parents.
Preference weights. Starting with the in-high-school outcomes, taste or preference for sub-
jects is conrmed to be the most valued outcome by both children and parents, as well as across
decision protocol groups and data sources.
The dierence in utility generated by the prospect of having to study and to do homework
for at least 2.5 hours daily versus not having to is negative for the k = 1 children and positive,
but not signicant, for the other two groups. This coecient is negative also among k 2 f2;3g
parents, but it is not signicant. Because the k = 1 subsample is more populated by male
children attending curricula with longer school hours, less homework and home study time, and
more manual laboratory classes (e.g., the vocational and technical industrial and the artistic
tracks), this pattern is suggestive of dierential preferences for these kinds of schedule and
activities as well as gender dierences.
The importance rank of graduating in the regular time, between 3rd and 5th among all
outcomes, is fairly stable across protocol groups; however, its relative magnitude (with respect
to taste for subjects) is highest in the k = 2 group and lowest in the k = 1 group. Again, this
may be capturing dierential preferences for a regular path among high ability students and
girls, more represented in the k = 2 group (see table 2). On the contrary, this outcome does not
appear to be particularly important for parents, since its coecient is not signicantly dierent
from 0 in all specications and groups.
As for being in school with friends, its utility weight is positive among children and negative
among parents for most specications, but it is never signicant. Finally, when the outcome
\make (the relevant) parent happy" is introduced, qualitative results do not change and, as for
the benchmark model, the coecient for this outcome is always positive and usually signicant.
Its relative importance, however, vary across protocol groups, being substantially higher among
k = 1 children. Hence, to the extent that children have some knowledge, albeit imperfect, of
their parents' preferences, this suggests that even k = 1 parents are likely to play a relevant
role in their children's choice, perhaps more indirectly.
Moving to outcomes capturing choices and opportunities after graduation from high school,
k = 2 children display a relatively strong preference for being able to make a exible college
eld choice, second most important outcome to them after like the subjects, followed by nd a
liked job after graduation and make a exible college-work choice. k = 3 children, too, place
a high preference on making a exible college eld choice, whose coecient is comparable in
26magnitude to that of attending college. This pattern seems intuitive, given that these two
groups are made of relatively high ability and high socio-economic background students, more
concentrated in general curricula (see table 2). Less intuitive is the fact that parents assign
higher importance ranks and relatively higher weights to nding a liked job immediately after
graduation and to making a exible college-work choice than to making a exible college eld
choice and to attending college, respectively.
The picture for k = 1 children is somewhat more complex. On the one hand, their SPs imply
a strong and intuitive preference for nding a liked job immediately after graduation. On the
other hand, estimates obtained from RP data generate signicant utility weights on attending
college, followed by making a exible college-work choice, and a non-signicant coecient for
nding a liked job immediately after graduation. When combining SP and RP data and letting
preference coecients vary across data sources one outcome at the time, I generally cannot reject
the null hypothesis of equal SP and RP coecients based on an LR test, with the exceptions of
making a exible college eld choice (b9) and nding a liked job after graduation (b10). Hence,
in columns 11 and 13 of table 9 (specications S5 and S6 respectively) I allow coecients of
both b9 and b10 to vary between (RP,1) and (SP,1), while constraining the remaining ones to
be equal in the two models. A LR test rejects the fully constrained specications S2 and S4 in
favor of S5 and S6.27
Another dierence between RP and SP for group k = 1 concerns the orientation suggestion.
As suggested by the descriptive evidence shown in subsection 3.2, the RP model implies a
stronger role for the orientation dummy, whose coecient is approximately twice as large as
that implied by the SP data. Even larger dierences are observed for the other two groups
(k 2 f2;3g), where the orientation dummy is usually not signicantly dierent from 0 in the
SP component of the model.
Because the same expectations data are used to estimate the SP and RP utility parameters,
this nding suggests the existence of an additional channel, beyond that of expectations, through
which the orientation suggestion aect actual choices but not stated preferences. As previously
mentioned, this channel could be preferences directly or could be a separate stage of choice set
formation. The former may occur if, for instance, teachers publicize \institutionally approved"
criteria of curriculum choice (e.g., \children should focus on their attitudes without letting
themselves being inuenced by their friends' choices"), thereby oering second-order preferences
that children can adopt through a process of alignment of their rst-order preferences to them.
Of course this requires relaxation of the assumption that individuals' preference structures are
27A possible explanation is what the SP literature calls \prominence," i.e., respondents' tendency to focus only on few most
important attributes or not to consider situational constraints when responding stated choice questions. While prominence
would seem more likely to occur in stated choice tasks with hypothetical scenarios or in the kinds of SP-o-RP experiments
analyzed by Train and Wilson (2008), here it would imply that SPs and RPs do not coincide in more cases than they should.
Hence, if present, this type of response bias would go in the opposite direction than the \inertia or justication bias" generated,
e.g., by mechanisms of ex-post rationalization (discussed in appendix B.2.1).
27hardwired and cannot be manipulated via policies enacted by socialization agents (see Karniol
(2010) for a theory of socialization that develops this idea). The latter may occur if teachers'
opinions and recommendations aect choice sets used by families in the choice by inducing
them to consider alternatives that they would not consider otherwise or to drop alternatives
that they would seriously consider in the choice.28
Dierences between the data generating processes of SP and RP can be further investigated
by inspection of the SP/RP scale parameter and of the alternative-specic constants of the two
models. On the one hand, for the k = 1 group I cannot reject the hypothesis that 1 = 1 nor
a model with the RP and SP constants constrained to be equal to one another by alternative.
These ndings indicate that for the group of children that reported making a unilateral decision
the unobservable processes underlying RP and SP are reassuringly similar. On the other hand,
2 and 3 are signicantly dierent from 1 in all specications and range from 0.45 to 0.65,
meaning that the variance of the unobserved components of the SP model is between 2.5 and
5 times larger than the variance of the RP model.
A larger SP variance is a common nding in the SP-RP empirical literature (Morikawa, 1994).
This is not surprising, since SP data are usually elicited from stated choice experiments under
hypothetical scenarios in which respondents generally have only a subset of the information
they would have in actual choice situations. Hence, as pointed out by Manski (1999), stated
choice experiments tend to elicit preferences mixed with individual expectations of events that
may aect choice behavior and are not included in the proposed scenario. While in my setting
the SP task in one of recall and not one of choice under a hypothetical, it is possible that the
additional noise is indeed related to the mental process of recall and abstraction respondents
were required to perform. (For related issues concerning sp-o-rp experiments see also Train
and Wilson (2008).)
Protocol weights. Inspection of the top panel of table 10 reveals that variability of child-




with some precision only for few outcomes. For instance, children assign a greater weight on
their parents' opinions than on their own about graduating in the regular time, thereby trusting
parental assessments of their ability and eort better than theirs. The estimated weight for
this outcome ranges from 0.626 to 1.120, depending on the specication; however, all values
between 0.5 and 1 are compatible with the estimates, and for some specications even a weight
of 0 cannot be rejected.
The weight on child's preference for subjects is estimated precisely and lies between 0.411
and 0.457. The hypothesis of equal weights cannot be rejected, while 0 and 1 are rejected
28Endogeneity of the orientation dummy may be an alternative or additional explanation. However, if SP data are measured
with sucient accuracy the endogeneity eect should show up also in the SP model, which does not seem to occur at least for
the k 2 f2;3g groups.
28for all specications. The weight on making a exible college eld choice, instead, favors
child's opinion, and values above 0.5 can generally be rejected. As for the remaining outcomes,
weights are estimated imprecisely and are, therefore, compatible with any value between 0 and
1. Despite this, a model with equal weights across outcomes is rejected for all specications.
Estimates for the k = 3 group in top panel of table 12 refer to the weights on children's
utility components, fd 
c;3
n gN
n=1. The weight on child likes the subjects ranges between 0.15 and
0.3. A weight of 0 is rejected for all specications, and similarly for any weight greater or
equal to 0.5. On the contrary, weights on making a exible college eld choice and on nding
a liked job after graduation are favor the child; however, only values close to 0 can be rejected,
given estimates' precision. Estimated weights for the remaining outcomes are imprecise and
compatible with a large range of values, including 0 and 1.
For this group I cannot reject the null hypothesis of a unique weight aggregating child's and
parent's expected utilities. Estimates for the constrained model are shown in table 13. The
estimated weight on child's utility, which ranges between 0.295 and 0.370, is fairly precise; both
0 and values of 0.5 or above are rejected. This conrm the important explicit role of the k = 3
parents in their children's curriculum choice.
Of course, these estimates rely on the decision-making unit and decision process being cor-
rectly specied. To shed some light on potential misspecications, I test the multilateral deci-
sion models against the unilateral model and against one another. Since the unilateral model
is nested in both multilateral models, I perform LR tests for whether all weights on parental
beliefs are equal 0 in table 10 and for whether the weight on child's expected utility is equal 1
in table 13. The null hypothesis is rejected in both cases.
I nally estimate the specication in which the child chooses after listening to the parent on
the k = 3 subsample and I compare it with the child-parent joint decision model, and viceversa
for the k = 2 subsample. Since the two models are not nested, I use the test presented in Ben-
Akiva and Lerman (1985, p. 171-174) that compares the adjusted LR indeces of the two models
being tested, i.e., P
 
 2
B    2
A > z

 f [2  N  z  ln(J) + (KB   KA)]1=2g with z > 0, where
all N observations in the sample have all J alternatives and KA and KB are the number of
parameters of the two models. Based on this test, the specication in which the child chooses
after listening to the parent is found to be statistically superior for both k = 2 and k = 3
groups.29
29In fact, a comparison of reported family decision rules by children and by parents reveals less agreement (and hence higher
risk of missclassication) in distinguishing between rules 2 and 3 than between rule 1 versus the others (see Giustinelli (2010,
Chpt. 2) for more details).
295 Counterfactual Analysis
Galileo and Michelangelo, Resumed. In this paper I maintain the standard assumption
that preferences used to trade o dierent outcomes' states are hardwired and cannot be ma-
nipulated by policies. On the contrary, tastes or preferences for curricula's core subjects are
uncertain in the model, and individuals hold subjective beliefs on them. It is therefore possi-
ble that \awareness" or \desensitization" campaigns can inuence choice behavior by aecting
beliefs on taste. Hence, in table 14 I simulate two scenarios in which individual subjective
probabilities that the child will like the subjects of a specic curriculum change by a xed
amount.
Specically, in the top panel I calculate the percent changes in predicted enrollment shares
following a 0.1 increase in the subjective probabilities (of children, parents, and both) that the
child would enjoy the core subjects of the math-and-sciences curriculum (policy 1). Whereas,
in the bottom panel I report the corresponding changes following a 0.1 drop in the probabilities
that the child would like the subjects of the artistic curriculum (policy 2). Calculations are
done separately for the pooled samples (unitary models) and for the dierent decision protocol
groups (protocol-specic models).
These policies generate, for all groups and models, an intuitive increase of the probability
of enrolling in the math-and-science curriculum and a drop of the art enrollment probability.
Choice probabilities of all other curricula display the opposite pattern. Such changes, however,
are heterogeneous across models and targeted recipients, suggesting that decision-making pro-
tocol and identity of the targeted group(s) matters. For instance, assuming a unitary model
with parents as representative decision makers sizeably overestimates the magnitude of enroll-
ment response to awareness and desensitization campaigns implied by the heterogenous model
(+18.93 vs. +12.07 for math-and-science awareness, and -18.91% vs. -13.28% for art desen-
sitization). Whereas a unitary model based on children's expectations generates much closer
predictions (+11.16% vs. +12.07 and -13.77% vs. -13.28%, respectively).
Publication of Education Statistics. I then simulate policies that make curriculum-specic
statistics available to families.30 Specically, in the top panel of table 15 I calculate the per-
cent changes in predicted enrollment probabilities following publication of the 2006 high school
graduation rates by curriculum of graduation (conditional on a regular path) based on Al-
30This is similar in spirit to existing works in economics of education that analyze the eect on parents' school choices of
disclosure of information on school-level characteristics, such as school test scores (see Hastings and Weinstein (2008) for an
application exploiting both a natural and a eld experiments). Indeed, most high schools in Verona, and in Italy more generally,
have public web-pages where some of them post, among other information, school-level statistics for previous cohorts (e.g.,
passing rates between grades) and post-graduation outcomes (e.g., college enrollment by eld and job placement by sector). Of
course, while statistics summarizing outcomes of previous cohorts by chosen action constitute in principle useful information,
in practice decision makers attempting to use such information face, as econometricians would, the identication problem
known as selection (see analysis by Manski (2004b)).
30maDiploma (2007a)'s statistics (policy 3).31 And in the top panel of Table 16 I show percent
changes in predicted enrollment probabilities following disclosure of the AlmaDiploma (2007b)'s
statistics on 2006 college enrollment by graduation curriculum (policy 5). These statistics are
the most recent ones that could have been made available to families of my sample, whose
children entered high school in Fall 2007.
Policy 3 generates a moderate increase in predicted enrollment in general curricula, espe-
cially the humanities and math, and a drop in predicted enrollment in the vocational and artistic
curricula. While this pattern is suggestive of a potential overstatement of the diculty levels
of general curricula, the protocol-specic predictions show an intuitive attenuated pattern for
the k = 2 group, especially the children, which is probably due to selection of girls and higher
socio-economic background/higher ability children into this group (see table 2). In turn, policy
5 generates qualitatively similar predictions, this time suggesting a potential underestimation
of the \costs" of going to college after receiving a not fully suitable training.32
Last but not least, decomposition of counterfactual enrollment responses by decision-making
rule for these experiments shows that publication of education statistics would have a larger
impact on the group of children reporting unilateral decision by self. While this cannot be nec-
essarily taken as a sign that these children have less precise beliefs, this is indeed one possibility.
Of course this may be either due to dierential observable or unobservable characteristics of
children across protocol groups (such as ability or access to information) or to the very decision
protocol (or to both). In particular, families in which parents have a greater involvement in
their children's choice may be relying more on statistics and on other \hard" information from
teachers, schools, and orientation (see Adams and Ferreira (2010) for a similar argument about
individual vs. multilateral decision, but in a dierent context).
Institutional Policies. In the bottom panels of tables 15 and 16 I simulate the eects of
changes in families' beliefs generated by two institutional-type policies. Policy 4 lowers ed-
ucational standards and equalizes them across curricula by guaranteeing all children a pass
in all grades through the diploma for all curricula.33 In practice, I assume that individuals
hold subjective probabilities that the child will graduate in the regular time equal to 1 for all
curricula, keeping expectations for the other outcomes xed.
31AlmaDiploma is a consortium that collects data on attainment, college, and labor market outcomes of high school graduates
in Italy with the aims of providing them with college orientation services and of facilitating matching of labor demand and
labor supply for high school graduates (see http://www.almadiploma.it).
32A limitation of this counterfactual experiment is that, although these statistics are curriculum specic, they are not
disaggregated by individuals' characteristics, such as gender or academic ability (see Sartarelli (2011) for an argument in
favor of disclosure of conditional statistics in the context of college major choice). More generally, the exercise assumes that
disclosed statistics are taken and used by decision makers at face value, since no model of expectations' formation and updating
is specied and estimated.
33While taken literally this policy may appear unrealistic and probably not desirable, its dynamics are similar to those
generated by the introduction of \educational debits" or \fail credits" by the Law 425-1997, subsequently modied by the Law
1-2007. De facto this system enabled children with grades below the passing level in one or more subjects to progress through
school grades by contracting \educational debits" that could be (easily) cleared at some later time.
31Policy 6, instead, strengthens specialization by preventing access to university following any
diploma of the vocational type, similar to the Italian secondary system before the 1969 reform
that opened university access to students graduating from technical and vocational schools. In
the simulation I assume that individuals hold zero subjective probabilities of going to college,
of facing a exible college-work choice, and of facing a exible choice of eld in college after
graduating from any vocational curriculum.
As expected, the rst intervention tends to stimulate enrollment in general curricula and
in some technical curricula while depressing enrollment in vocational and artistic curricula.
But responses do not seem large. Once again the pattern is attenuated, and in some cases
reversed, among the k = 2 children who are likely the least \ability constrained." In turn, the
second intervention induces a huge drop in vocational enrollment, mostly in favor of technical
schools. The latter result is intuitive: children who value the possibility of going to college
after graduation, but that would enroll in a vocational curriculum if the restriction were not in
place, would now switch to curricula of the \lowest" track that ensures eligibility for enrolling in
college. Finally, the decomposition by decision protocol shows that if parents only were aware
of policies changing institutional features of tracking, the impact of such policies may be much
smaller than it would be if children, too, were informed.
6 Relationship with Existing Research
6.1 Curricular Stratication, Intergenerational Transmission, and Career
Decisions under Uncertainty
Most schooling systems feature some form of stratication or tracking, which can be by ability
(as in the U.S.), curricular, or a combination of the two (as in many European countries).
The distinctive purpose of the latter is to provide educational specialization so that children
with dierent aptitudes and aspirations may pursue careers in dierent areas and requiring
dierent types of expertise. Yet, signicant cross-country variation exists in how stratication
is implemented, depending on its time, the allocation mechanism of children into tracks, and
the extent of specialization and separation of dierent tracks.34 In turn, these variables are the
main determinants of the (form and degree of) uncertainty faced by families regarding their
children's education paths and future outcomes: On one side, the earlier the child's age at
34There exists a sizeable literature in economics of education concerned with how institutional features of a stratied
schooling system aects its eciency (e.g., Ariga et al. (2010)) and equity (e.g., Brunello and Checchi (2007)). Prominent
issues analyzed by this literature are the tension between breadth and depth of education and the determination of the optimal
time of tracking (e.g., Brunello et al. (2007)). In the OECD group, for instance, the age of rst tracking ranges from 10 in
Austria and Germany to 18 in Canada and the U.S., and 15-16 are modal (Brunello and Checchi, 2007). In fact, the American
system is considered to be de-tracked curricular-wise, though recently some states have experienced specialization shifts, such
as the Florida requirement that 9th graders declare a major (I thank David Figlio for pointing this out). As for the sorting
mechanism, typical ones are testing (e.g., in Germany) and family choice (e.g., in Italy). As for the degree of rigidity, a
fully rigid stratication (as in Germany) is characterized by the impossibility of switching between tracks during compulsory
education and by barriers to college enrollment following graduation from \lower" vocational-type tracks.
32tracking the longer the future that must be anticipated and the less the accumulated history
of past school performance that can be used to form expectations on the child's tastes, ability,
and future outcomes. On the other side, the stronger and more rigid is specialization the more
dicult are \wrong choices" to be costlessly corrected or corrected at all.
The Italian system considered in this paper constitutes an interesting hybrid characterized
by a relative early tracking (at entry in high school) that is, in principle, mitigated by family
choice as a sorting device and by exibility mechanisms enabling both track switching during
high school (passerelle or \bridges") and enrollment in university following any 5-year diploma
from any track. Based on anecdotal and sociological evidence (e.g., Istituto IARD (2001,
2005)), however, Italian families (especially the children) seem to believe that a wrong training
in high school will generally carry a \cost" in form of an inadequate preparation for college (or
work) and unfavorably perceive track switching as likely yielding a longer time to graduation.
Hence, these exibility mechanisms do not appear to unambiguously reduce the uncertainty
accompanying an early curricular stratication.
As a matter of fact, tracking during compulsory education renders curriculum choice a
(early) career decision that, as such, requires a large investment in training and is per se
characterized by uncertainty on individual ability and investment returns (e.g., Altonji (1993)
and Arcidiacono (2004)). My work contributes to existing empirical studies of curriculum choice
with early curricular stratication (e.g., Checchi and Flabbi (2007)) by modeling uncertainty
explicitly, but without imposing strong assumptions on how youths and their parents form
expectations on future choice-related outcomes (see Manski (1993) and references therein).
Moreover, such a structural albeit simple framework enables me to perform novel counterfactual
exercises simulating the eects on curriculum enrollment of policies involving publication of
information aiming at reducing families' uncertainty and modication of variables regulating
rigidity and standards of stratication.
Some scholars have further claimed that track choice by families (as opposed to testing) ul-
timately translates into a greater dependence of children's paths on family background, thereby
hampering intergenerational mobility (Checchi and Flabbi, 2007). According to this view, cur-
riculum choice may be a channel through which parents end up creating their children in their
own image ( a la Bisin and Verdier (2001)) rather than improving their children's condition (as
in Doepke and Zilibotti (2008)). However, while intergenerational transmission of preferences
and beliefs from parents to children is commonly considered to be the main vehicle for either
possibilities, very little is known in practice of how children and parents perceive uncertain
dimensions of curriculum choice and of what roles children and parents play in it. Hence, the
main contribution of the data collection and the empirical analysis carried by this work is clearly
to provide new and more rigorous and detailed evidence on some these issues.35
35Saez-Marti and Zilibotti (2008) review the cultural transmission-endogenous preference literature and summarize the two
336.2 Parenting and Decision Making by Children
As just mentioned, the literature on curriculum choice posits a crucial role of family background
(Checchi and Flabbi, 2007). Despite this, to the best of my knowledge no existing study has
explicitly modeled the roles of children and parents in the choice. For instance, Arcidiacono
et al. (2011) and Zafar (2008) estimate models of college major choice under uncertainty using
measures of subjective probabilities and counterfactuals from students of two top American
universities. Both works assume that college students are the main decision makers of their
major, which appears sensible given the latter's age. And yet, based on data on perceived
(by students) parental approval and expectations, Zafar (2008, 2011) nds evidence of a likely
strong parental inuence in the choice. In turn, Attanasio and Kaufmann (2010) analyze high
school and college enrollment decisions in rural Mexico with data from Progresa and nd that
both children's and parents' expectations matter for the former, while only youths' expectations
are relevant for the latter. However, they do not model child-parent interaction explicitly.
In truth, identication of a proper decision-making unit for this type of choice is not at all
unambiguous. The main diculty is that, on the one hand, adolescents undergo development
of their preferences and capabilities for communication, formal reasoning, and independent ac-
tion; on the other hand, they still rely on parental guidance and support. In particular, while
adolescents appear old enough to play an active role in their schooling decisions, their level
and rate of autonomy acquisition will generally vary with their traits, ability, environment, as
well as parental preferences, resources, and parenting style (see Lundberg et al. (2009) and
reference therein from developmental psychology). It seems, therefore, natural to hypothe-
size existence of heterogeneous decision rules across families, ranging from unilateral to more
interacted protocols.
Despite this fact, to date only a recent handful of studies, such as Bursztyn and Coman
(2011) and Berry (2010), have challenged the unitary view of household behavior (Becker,
1981) in the context of educational choices. These works develop non-cooperative models of
child-parent interactions with moral hazard motivating empirical applications on children's
school attendance (or achievement) using data from eld experiments in developing countries.
Specically, Bursztyn and Coman (2011) analyze adolescents' school attendance in Brazilian
favelas and provide evidence that child-parent conicts play an important role via the parents'
diculty of monitoring their children's actions. Whereas Berry (2010) tests whether identity of
main modeling approaches. In the paternalistic model parents use their own preferences to evaluate their children's utility
and, with some eort, seek to transmit their preference trait to the latter (as in Bisin and Verdier (2001)). Whereas, in the
non-paternalistic model (e.g., Doepke and Zilibotti (2008)), parents choose their children's preferences to maximize children's
well-being by making a costly investment, but without necessarily trying to install their own cultural variant. My framework
incorporates both non-paternalistic and paternalistic features. On the one hand, parents and children share the same objective
function, i.e., choosing the curriculum that matches the child best while accounting for both early and later future consequences
of this choice. And, with this very purpose, parents may try to aect children's choice (and future) via the channels of beliefs'
transmission or of a negotiated choice. On the other hand, parents' intervention is based on their own beliefs and preferences
over future states, which are allowed to dier from those of their children.
34recipients (i.e., children or parents) of cash incentives for school achievement (e.g., enrollment
and attendance) in India aects their eectiveness.36
My paper contributes to this stream of works by analyzing a dierent schooling choice
margin (i.e., \quality" vs. \quantity" of human capital, although the two are clearly related in
a stratied context) and by explicitly modeling child-parent decision making with heterogeneous
cooperative-type rules. The latter choice is justied by the fact that in my setting children and
parents are assumed to solve the very same problem. Thus, even though in this paper I do not
model family selection into decision rules, which I take as exogenously given, the underlying idea
is that cooperation exists whenever communication of opinions, information, and preferences
can improve quality of choice.37
7 Conclusions
In this paper I study the empirical identication of a framework of static decision making under
uncertainty with multiple decision makers and no strategic interactions that combines elements
of Savage (1954)'s setup, Harsanyi (1955)'s utilitarian aggregation, and Raia (1968)'s experts
problem. The identication problem is one of distinguishing how decision makers' beliefs and
preferences over outcomes' states and their decision rule determine actual choices.
I use this framework to analyze high school curriculum choice with curricular stratication,
conceptualized as a choice with uncertain child's taste, ability, and future opportunities and
choices, and one in which child's and parents' decision-making roles may vary across families.
I employ purposely collected data on families' actual choices and decision rules together with
children's and parents' stated choice preferences and probabilistic beliefs over outcomes' states
to unpack the determinants of this choice and to estimate structural parameters capturing
children's and parents' trade-os among dierent outcomes' states and parameters describing
family rules.
Estimates of two unitary-family models (Becker, 1981), alternatively assuming that children
and parents are the representative decision makers, suggest that children and parents hold
36These papers and mine t in with an emerging literature studying child-parent interactions and decision-making dynamics
and their consequences on children's outcomes (e.g., Weinberg (2001), Burton et al. (2002), Hao et al. (2008), Lizzeri and
Siniscalchi (2008), and Cosconati (2011), among others). These studies model child-parent interactions as non-cooperative
games for, under the inuence of earlier works exploring limitations of Becker (1981)'s Rotten Kid Theorem (e.g., Bergstrom
(1989)), they consider the standard assumption of (inter-spouses) bargaining (that binding, costlessly enforceable agreements
can support an ecient solution) not plausible in the child-parent context (see Lundberg et al. (2009) for a discussion).
37In fact, modeling this aspect explicitly would require confronting the issue of how certain are individuals about the
probabilities for, to the extent that child and parent disagree about some of them, one may have better information than
the other (I thank Peter Arcidiacono for articulating this point). While this seems beyond the scope of this paper and the
possibilities of my data{since the survey asked respondents to provide point probabilities without encouraging them to express
their potential ambiguity through ranges or second order beliefs{it did, nonetheless, ask them to express on a 0-100 scale
how sure they had felt ex ante that their favorite curriculum would be their best option. (And, if such a probability was less
than 100, it asked respondents to split the remaining amount among the curricula they thought would alternatively be their
best option.) Assuming xed preferences, the latter variable may be interpreted as an aggregate (i.e., not outcome-specic)
measure of how certain are individuals about their beliefs. The interested reader can nd a descriptive analysis of this measure
in relationship to the family decision rules in Giustinelli (2010, Chpt. 3).
35similar beliefs and preferences over outcomes' states. Nevertheless, dierences in the relative
magnitude of preference parameters between the two groups, a stronger explanatory power of
children's expectations on actual choices, and direct information on families' decision rules all
point to a prominent role played by children. In fact, accounting for decision rule heterogeneity
reveals that children reporting own decision after listening to their parents trust parental opinion
better than their own for some outcomes (e.g., those concerning their ability, but not those
regarding their preferences for subjects). And estimates of the joint decision-making model
support a substantial inuence of parental preferences on the nal choice for the corresponding
group of families, with approximate relative weights of f1=3;2=3g in favor of parents.
I use the estimates to simulate response of curriculum enrollment to changes in individual
expectations generated by \awareness" campaigns, provision of information on outcomes of
previous cohorts, and institutional policies aecting curricular standards and specialization.
I nd that the unitary-family benchmark and the model with heterogeneous decision rules
generate intuitive and qualitatively similar predictions that, nonetheless, are quantitatively
dierent. In particular, identity of policy recipients{whether children, parents, or both{matters
for enrollment response, implying that accounting for decision makers' beliefs and decision rule
heterogeneity is important for policy analysis.
Taken altogether, the results suggest that it is important that the economics of the family
provides a formal accommodation for the role of adolescents in family decision-making and that
the economics of education takes into account the channels and degree in which parents transmit
their beliefs and preferences to their children{whether because they want to make them in their
own image or, on the contrary, because they wish to help them make better choices and face
better future opportunities.
Inevitably, this work relies on simplications and assumptions concerning both the the-
oretical framework and the study design. On the theoretical side, separability of uncertain
outcomes (i) and of beliefs and utility valuations over outcomes' states (ii) follow directly from
the adopted Bayesian-type framework  a la Gilboa et al. (2004). In turn, exogeneity of decision
makers' beliefs with respect to choice preferences (iii) posits an imperfect information model
of randomness that allows decision makers to measure attributes (i.e., the objective realization
probabilities) with error, but assumes that such errors do not aect decision making. (E.g., this
assumption would be violated if decision makers were aware of their errors, were risk averse,
and had dierential information across alternatives.)
As for exogeneity of family decision protocols with respect to choice preferences (iv), while
the former appear to be statistically related with actual choices in my data, it remains to be
established whether such a relationship is structural in nature, as it would be if, e.g., selection
of a family decision rule for curriculum choice were dependent on child's and parent's beliefs
and preferences structures. Indeed, this may due to gains and costs from cooperation (as in
36Del Boca and Flinn (2011)), a deliberate parental behavior (as in Bisin and Verdier (2001) and
Doepke and Zilibotti (2008)), or some other reasons. And if any of these were true, quantifying
the eects of a policy targeting family members' expectations would require a joint model of
decision rule selection and curriculum choice, since that policy would aect curriculum choice
both directly and through the channel of decision rule selection.
Finally, I decided to focus on cooperative family processes (v) because of a main feature
curriculum choice shares with the Raia (1968)'s panel-of-experts problem, in which aggregation
of family members' preferences and beliefs is implicitly motivated by the wish of making a better
choice than the one a single member would make individually. Nonetheless, it is clear that the
typical nature of child-parent interactions suggests exploring also non-cooperative, agency-type
avenues (e.g., Cosconati (2011)).
Additional modeling simplications, such as the non-structural (or not fully structural)
treatment (vi) of formation of children's choice set (possibly shaped by parents and teachers),
(vii) of the role of friends (\peer or network eects"), and (viii) of preferences for exibility
in the subsequent work and college choices, were mostly dictated by constraints on the study
design. I consider this work to be a rst step; points (iv)-through-(viii) are in progress within
a new prospective and longitudinal (during-the-choice) study.






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































38Table 2: Background Characteristics
Unitary Protocol 1 Protocol 2 Protocol 3
Background Model Sample Sample Sample
Characteristics Sample
Gender
Male 433 (43.39) 92 (54.12) 72 (32.88) 115 (48.32)
Female 561 (56.21) 78 (45.88) 147 (67.12) 123 (51.68)
Non-response 4 (0.40) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Child's country of Birth
Italy 907 (90.88) 153 (90.00) 211 (96.35) 229 (96.22)
Foreign Country 86 (8.62) 16 (9.41) 8 (3.65) 9 (3.78)
Non-response 5 (0.50) 1 (0.59) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Father's Country of Origin
Italy 846 (84.77) 137 (80.59) 203 (92.69) 220 (92.44)
Foreign Country 79 (7.92) 17 (10.00) 10 (4.57) 9 (3.78)
Non-response 73 (7.31) 16 (9.41) 6 (2.74) 9 (3.78)
Mother's Country of Origin
Italy 830 (83.17) 137 (80.59) 201 (91.78) 220 (92.44)
Foreign Country 116 (11.62) 24 (14.12) 15 (6.85) 15 (6.30)
Non-response 52 (5.21) 9 (5.29) 3 (1.37) 3 (1.26)
Father's Education
Junior high school or less 246 (24.65) 55 (32.35) 51 (23.29) 53 (22.27)
High school 372 (37.27) 54 (31.76) 95 (43.38) 107 (44.96)
College or more 192 (19.24) 29 (17.06) 46 (21.00) 48 (20.17)
Non-response 188 (18.84) 32 (18.82) 27 (12.33) 30 (12.61)
Mother's Education
Junior high school or less 250 (25.05) 50 (29.41) 53 (24.20) 59 (24.79)
High school 448 (44.89) 73 (42.94) 119 (54.34) 116 (48.74)
College or more 173 (17.33) 25 (14.71) 41 (18.72) 51 (21.43)
Non-response 127 (12.73) 22 (12.94) 6 (2.74) 12 (5.04)
Child's Graduation Grade
from Junior High School
Excellent 190 (19.04) 17 (10.00) 74 (33.79) 61 (25.63)
Distinction 235 (23.55) 39 (22.94) 63 (28.77) 57 (23.95)
Good 291 (29.16) 49 (28.82) 47 (21.46) 73 (30.67)
Pass 249 (24.95) 62 (36.47) 28 (12.79) 43 (18.07)
Non-response 33 (3.31) 3 (1.76) 7 (3.20) 4 (1.68)
Total 998 (100) 170 (100) 219 (100) 238 (100)
39Table 3: Comparing Family Revealed Preference (RP) and Child Stated Preference (C's
SP)
Unitary Unitary Protocol 1 Protocol 2 Protocol 3 Total
Model Model Reported Reported Reported (1+2+3)
All Matched by Child by Child by Child
RP  C's SP 836 (86.09) 475 (87.16) 151 (88.82) 194 (88.58) 207 (86.97) 552 (88.04)
RP 6= C's SP 135 (13.91) 70 (12.84) 19 (11.18) 25 (11.42) 31 (13.03) 75 (11.96)
Total 971 (100) 545 (100) 170 (100) 219 (100) 238 (100) 627 (100)
Percentages in parentheses.
Table 4: Comparing Family Revealed Preference (RP) and Parent Stated Preference (P's
SP)
Unitary Protocol 1 Protocol 2 Protocol 3 Total
Model Reported Reported Reported (1+2+3)
Matched by Child by Child by Child
RP  P's SP 327 (60) 44 (54.32) 127 (59.07) 150 (63.03) 321 (60.11)
RP 6= P's SP 218 (40) 37 (45.68) 88 (40.93) 88 (36.97) 213 (39.89)
Total 545 (100) 81 (100) 215 (100) 238 (100) 534 (100)
Percentages in parentheses.
: Smaller size for these groups than in corresponding cells of table 3
are due to higher item non-response rates to the SP question among parents.
40Table 5: Family RP, Child's SP, and Junior High School Suggestion - k = 1 Group
RP  JH RP 6= JH Marginals
RP  Child's SP 68 (55.74) 37 (30.33) 105 (86.07)
RP 6= Child's SP 10 (8.20) 7 (5.74) 17 (13.93)
Marginals 78 (63.93) 44 (36.07) 122 (100)
Percentages in parentheses.
Table 6: Family RP, Child's SP, Parent's SP, and \Group Rationality" (P.O.) - k = 3 Group
RP P.O. RP :P.O. Marginals
RPC's SPP's SP 138 (57.98) 0 (0) 138 (57.98)
RPC's SP6=P's SP 69 (28.99) 0 (0) 69 (28.99)
RPP's SP6=C's SP 12 (5.04) 0 (0) 12 (5.04)
RP6=C's SP&P's SP 7 (2.94) 12 (5.04) 19 (7.98)




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































45Table 10: \Child Chooses After Listening to the Parent" { Children's SP-RP Model
Variables (S1) (S2) (S2d) (S3) (S4) (S4d)
Weights on Parent's Expectations





















































































































































































































Constants Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes













Log-likelihood (LL(^ )) -161.119 -156.909 -116.437 -132.824 -128.487 -93.125
Adjusted Likelihood Ratio Index ( 2) 0.806 0.807 0.839 0.820 0.824 0.851
Sample Size 219 205
: signicant at 1%, : signicant at 5%, : signicant at 10%. Asymptotic robust standard errors in
parentheses.  2 = 1   [LL(^ )   K]=LL(0), where LL(^ ) is the value of the log-likelihood at the parameter
estimates, K is the number of the estimated parameters, and LL(0) is the value of the log-likelihood under
no model (Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985). Optimization performed in Matlab.
46Table 11: \Child Chooses After Listening to the Parent" { Parents' SP Model
Variables (S1) (S1d) (S3) (S3d)




































































Constants Yes Yes Yes Yes
RP Dummies No Yes No Yes
Log-likelihood (LL(^ )) -268.705 -244.8485 -244.111 -221.891
Adjusted Likelihood Ratio Index ( 2) 0.433 0.461 0.445 0.471
Sample Size 219 205
: signicant at 1%, : signicant at 5%, : signicant at 10%. Asymptotic robust standard
errors in parentheses.  2 = 1   [LL(^ )   K]=LL(0), where LL(^ ) is the value of the log-likelihood
at the parameter estimates, K is the number of the estimated parameters, and LL(0) is the value
of the log-likelihood under no model (Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985). Optimization performed
in Matlab.
47Table 12: \Child and Parent Make a Joint Decision" { Outcome-Specific Weights
Variables (S1) (S2) (S2d) (S3) (S4) (S4d)
Child's Weights




























































































































































































































































































































Constants Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
RP Dummies No No Yes No No Yes












Log-likelihood (LL(^ )) -502.383 -494.693 -437.941 -457.802 -450.630 -401.005
Adjusted Likelihood Ratio Index ( 2) 0.663 0.667 0.689 0.667 0.671 0.690
Sample Size 238 223
: signicant at 1%, : signicant at 5%, : signicant at 10%. Asymptotic robust standard errors in
parentheses.  2 = 1   [LL(^ )   K]=LL(0), where LL(^ ) is the value of the log-likelihood at the parameter
estimates, K is the number of the estimated parameters, and LL(0) is the value of the log-likelihood under
no model (Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985). Optimization performed in Matlab.
48Table 13: \Child and Parent Make a Joint Decision" { Single Weight









































































































































































































































Constants Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
RP Dummies No No Yes No No Yes












Log-likelihood (LL(^ )) -507.4697 -501.9089 -445.5068 -463.1923 -457.8141 -407.4601
Adjusted LR Index ( 2) 0.664 0.667 0.689 0.668 0.671 0.690
Sample Size 238 223
: signicant at 1%, : signicant at 5%, : signicant at 10%. Asymptotic robust standard errors in
parentheses.  2 = 1   [LL(^ )   K]=LL(0), where LL(^ ) is the value of the log-likelihood at the parameter
estimates, K is the number of the estimated parameters, and LL(0) is the value of the log-likelihood under
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A Choice-Based Sampling and the WESML Estimator
Likelihood function. Let us rst dene P(~ jjx;) to be the conditional probability that alternative
~ j 2 J is selected given covariates x 2 X; it species the behavioral choice model up to a parameter
vector  2  to be estimated. Additionally, p(x) denotes the marginal distribution of attributes, Q(~ j) the
population share of response ~ j, and H(~ j) the corresponding sampling probability. Following Manski and
McFadden (1981), the likelihood of observing the generic attributes-choice pair (x;~ j) under choice-based
sampling can then be written as
cb(x;~ j) = p(xj~ j)H(~ j) =
P(~ jjx;)p(x)
Q(~ j)














depends on the true  via Q(~ j), which therefore needs to be accounted for in estimation. This diers
from the case of random sampling, where the kernel would simply be P(~ jjx;).
Estimation. A number of dierent estimators have been proposed to estimate  in (10), depending
on a researcher's knowledge of p and Q (see Cosslett (1993)'s review). Manski and Lerman (1977)'s
weighted exogenous maximum likelihood estimator (WESML) is a pseudo-maximum likelihood approach
that starts from the likelihood function appropriate under exogenously stratied sampling and re-weights
the data to achieve consistency, with weights equal to [H(j)=Q(j)]
 1. Hence, knowledge of fQ(j)gJ
j=1
is required, but not that of p(x). I use the WESML estimator because of its tractability and its best-
predictor interpretation under misspecication of the logit model (Xie and Manski, 1989). The random
sampling maximum likelihood estimator (RSMLE) with the intercepts' correction proposed by McFadden
(see Manski and Lerman (1977) for details) is, in fact, a more popular and ecient alternative, but it
relies on the logit assumption being correct.
Ex-post conditioning. In Giustinelli (2010, Chpt. 2) I formally show that, similar to the case of
random sampling, ex-post conditioning does not aect estimation under choice-based sampling. Hence,
the WESML estimator can be used without modications to consistently estimate (the RP components
of) the protocol-specic models.
Multiple sources of preference data. The likelihood in (10) can be easily rewritten for the case
with multiple sources of preference data,




where j indexes families' actual choices, y indexes children's stated-preferred alternatives, and h indexes
parents' stated-preferred alternatives, with j;y;h 2 J. It is then clear that if the dierent sources of
data are treated as independent conditional on the observables, the likelihood function is simply equal














and where xj, xy and xh, as well as j, y and h may overlap, and their unions are equal to the vectors
x and , respectively. Possible relationships or restrictions between covariates and parameters across
data sources are specied by the structural model. In this case, only the RP component, j, needs to be
corrected by the usual factor H(j)=Q(j). In appendix B.2.2 I discuss the extension of this framework to
account for persistent (across data sources) unobservable heterogeneity while accounting for choice-based
sampling of RP.
B Robustness Checks and Discussions
B.1 Statistical Inference
Statistical inference is based on the robust (\sandwich") asymptotic variance-covariance matrix derived
by Manski and Lerman (1977) for the WESML estimator. Because sample size is modest for the protocol-
specic models, as a robustness check I additionally calculated 95% bias-corrected bootstrap condence
intervals (not shown for reasons of space, but available upon request). These bootstrap estimates are
virtually identical to the asymptotic ones for the unitary models and somewhat larger than the latter
for the protocol-specic models. However, coecients' signicance levels remain mostly unchanged and
qualitative patterns are identical.
57While econometric theory and simulation evidence suggest that the bootstrap may be superior,
especially if applied to pivotal statistics such as condence intervals (see Horowitz (2001) for details),
assessing superiority of the bootstrap for this particular application would require an ad-hoc Montecarlo
study, which is left for a separate work. More specically, existing simulations for the logit model provide
evidence that in small samples bootstrap standard errors tend to outperform the asymptotic ones while
overestimating the true values (e.g., Teebagy and Chatterjee (1989)); nonetheless, standard errors are
not asymptotically pivotal statistics, and evidence is lacking for non-random samples.
Finally, calculating condence intervals that account for the fact that students are physically clustered
in classrooms may be a desirable additional check. Unfortunately, the small number of classes within
choices makes it infeasible to perform with my data. This is because with endogenous stratication
the bootstrap must be applied in a manner that preserves the original data structure, i.e., by drawing
observations{in this case classes in place of individuals as above{from choice subsamples rather than
from the whole sample. Nevertheless, two institutional arguments should help relaxing major concerns
on inference. First, conditional on the attended curriculum, the assumption that extracting classes
within schools is equivalent to extracting individuals within schools is warranted by existing rules for
determination of class composition. Second, common factors faced by students at the class level (e.g.,
teachers) should not play a relevant role given that students were interviewed during the rst week
of school. Third, a concern would arise if children had copied from one another when lling in the
questionnaire in class.38 However, presence of the interviewer and of the teacher and my own personal
observation (as an interviewer) of class dynamics during administration of the survey makes this concern
rather weak.
B.2 Data Measurement and Model Specication
B.2.1 Stated Choice Preferences and Retrospective Elicitation
In an inuential paper concerned with ex-post rationalization by parents retrospectively reporting ex-ante
wantedness of their newly born children, Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993) found that wantedness stated
after children had been born was signicantly inuenced by children's traits. This example provides a
neat illustration of the most natural concern about validity of stated intention and stated preference
data elicited after actual choices have been made. In fact, the design of the NLSY79 pregnancy roster
used by Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993) and that of my data feature two fundamental dierences. First,
at the time of the survey none of the outcomes relevant for curriculum choice (with the exception of
being in school with friends) had realized nor signicant information had become available for families
to update their expectations (e.g., children had experienced only about 7-10 days of high school and
had never been tested during that period). Hence, respondents could not have updated their choice
preferences based on realized outcomes' states or new information on outcomes' realization probabilities.
Second, respondents were never inquired about whether they wanted to choose the curricula children
had actually enrolled in. Rather, they were presented with the universal set of curricula available in the
Verona Municipality and were asked to rank them according to their preferences, their expectations, and
the criteria they individually thought were important for the choice during the previous year.
The SP literature, in turn, names respondents' tendency to report stated choice preferences that
coincide with actual choices \justication bias" and attributes such a bias to some form of \inertia." In
fact, a recent paper by Chen and Risen (2010) shows analytically and experimentally that if people's
ratings or rankings are imperfect measures of their preferences, and their choices are at least partially
guided by their preferences, observed spreading (between their stated preferences elicited before and
after the choice) may not be unambiguosly taken as evidence of choice-induced attitude change due to
cognitive dissonance and ex-post rationalization, since it will generally occur even with stable preferences.
This notwithstanding, if when asked to state their choice preferences respondents do tend to report more
often the alternatives they did previously select in a real choice situation, such a tendency induces state
dependence of stated preferences on actual choices. Indeed, following Morikawa (1994), empirical works
in the SP-RP literature have included RP or \inertia" dummies in specication of SP utilities to deal
with state dependence.
In tables 10-13 I myself run \d" specications including inertia dummies in the SP utility functions.
(Results for the unitary SP-RP model are not presented for reasons of space but are available upon
request. On the other hand, no inertia specication was run for the k = 1 group, since logically incorrect
under the model's assumptions.) While such dummies have mostly signicant coecients (not shown
for reasons of space but available upon request), their inclusion does not change qualitative results for
the structural parameters.
These results should be interpreted cautiously, however, for the inclusion of inertia dummies may in-
duce estimates' bias and inconsistency if there exists also unobserved underspecied correlation between
38I thank Aviv Nevo for pointing this out.
58the SP and RP error terms. For instance, if something is omitted from the deterministic components
of SP and RP utility functions (e.g., see in equations (7) and (9)), then such an omission will generate
correlation between the error terms of the SP utility functions and the RP dummies that are, there-
fore, endogenous. On the other hand, the extensive Montecarlo evidence provided by Abramson et al.
(2000) indicates that only the coecient of the variable capturing state dependence would be severely
biased in presence of underspecied serial correlation (and only for extreme values of the latter), and
identies serial correlation as the least worrisome (for parameter bias and prediction) source of unob-
served heterogeneity relative to others, such as choice set eects, residual taste heterogeneity, and state
dependence.
B.2.2 Unobserved SP-RP Correlation
At least since Morikawa (1994), the SP-RP literature has exerted substantial eort to develop models
that build in (and tractable methods that can deal with) forms of dependence between multiple sources
of preference data generated by dierent designs of the stated preference or stated choice experiments
(see Train and Wilson (2008) for the econometrics of some state-of-the-art SP designs). Despite this
and despite the large volume of literature, especially in transportation, using combined SP and RP
data with the latter collected through a choice-based sampling protocol, the complications arising when
introduction of unobserved SP-RP correlation is combined with complex non-random survey designs
seem to have been largely ignored.
As an exception, in the context of an \intercept & follow" sampling design McFadden (1996) shows
that no natural extension to the WESML estimator exists for the case of unobserved heterogenity, since
the correction factor needed for this case will generally not be available in form of auxiliary data nor could
be calculated from the model without one knowing the parameters. However, for a more specic form of
unobservable persistence between SP and RP data, similar to that analyzed by Train and Wilson (2008)
for SP-o-RP designs, a natural extension to endogenous stratication may be possible. Exploration
and validation of such a possibility are in progress in a companion work. This would be especially
interesting with heterogeneous unilateral and multilateral decision rules since, as shown in Giustinelli
(2010, Chpt. 2), the particular error structure capturing correlation across data sources will generally
depend on the nature of the decision rule.
B.2.3 Probabilistic Expectations and the Retrospective Elicitation
Finally, I briey discuss potential issues related to retrospective elicitation of expectations data, while
abstracting from issues like rounding, approximation, or bunching at \focal values" (e.g., see Manski
and Molinari (2010)). Specically, I consider the case in which{whether due to recall bias or to lack
of eort{respondents report their post-choice expectations instead of their pre-choice expectations.39
(These two types of expectations may be seen as the two polar cases, of \no recall" and \perfect recall"
respectively, of a model of recall where retrospectively reported expectations are mixtures of the pre-
choice and the post-choice expectations.) Conditional on the decision protocol variable being error
free and on arguments developed in section B.2.1, retrospective elicitation is potentially problematic
only for k 2 f2;3g families. Intuitively, the closer reported probabilistic beliefs are to decision makers'
ex-post expectations the less variability will generally exist between children's and parents' reported
beliefs among the former protocol groups implying, at the minimum, less precise estimates of protocol
parameters. More formally, assuming that children report their expectations already updated to account
for their parents' beliefs (and viceversa) and using the relationship between observed ex-post expectations
and ex-ante unobserved expectations (known up to the updating parameters), one could write down the
misspecied model in terms of the true variables and protocol parameters (available upon request).
Usefulness of this exercise, however, is limited to making transparent that the implied measurement
error is non-classical and induces heteroskedastic errors (see also the discussion in Bound et al. (2001)).
In particular, this together with lack of closed form for the estimator makes it dicult to predict the
direction of the potential bias.
39In the context of unilateral decision making, Zafar (2010)'s ndings are positively reassuring. By analyzing patterns of
beliefs' updating, he is able to rule out cognitive dissonance being of serious concern nor does he nd evidence of systematic
(non-classical) measurement error in the reporting of beliefs.
59